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FOREWORD
Cyberspace may be the ultimate dual-edged
sword—the bright hope of its great intellectual and
communicative potential is in contrast to its dark reality to enable havoc and destruction. In April 2015,
then-Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter unveiled his
department’s new guidance on how the U.S. military
should address the myriad challenges emerging in the
cyberspace domain to a group of technology-savvy
leaders gathered at Stanford University. The 2015
Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber Strategy builds upon
the foundation of a 2011 strategy and stays true to its
three primary missions, as well as overarching national
security strategies—but can the new strategy work?
In this monograph, Mr. Jeffrey Caton explores various aspects of this question by examining the historical
context, traditional strategy elements, subsequent DoD
action, and whole-of-government approach contained
within the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. He argues that
positive assessments of the strategy’s suitability, feasibility, and acceptability for implementation may be
predicated upon the vagueness of the strategy’s overarching intent. Further, he contends that the strategy is
hampered by its own lack of clear end state, prioritization of efforts, and full context of the cyberspace realm
writ large. Fortunately, Mr. Caton also provides recommendations for future cyberspace-related defense
strategies in hope of improving their effectiveness.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) released
its Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which officially
recognized cyberspace as an operational domain akin
to the traditional military domains of land, sea, air,
and space. This monograph examines the 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy to evaluate how well its five strategic
goals and associated implementation objectives define
an actionable strategy to achieve three primary missions in cyberspace: defend the DoD network, defend
the United States and its interests, and develop cyber
capabilities to support military operations.
The topic of U.S. Federal cyberspace activities is
well-documented in many sources, thus this monograph serves as a primer to provide senior policymakers, decision makers, military leaders, and their
respective staffs with an overall appreciation for the
complexities, challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with the development of military cyberspace
operations. This report is limited to unclassified and
open source information; any classified discussion
must occur at another venue.
This monograph focuses on events and documents
from the period of about 1 year before and 1 year after
the 2015 strategy was released. This allows sufficient
time to examine the key policies and guidance that
influenced the development of the strategy, as well as
follow-on activities for the impacts from the strategy.
This inquiry has five major sections that utilize different frameworks of analysis to assess the strategy:
1. Prima Facie Analysis: This section is by intention only a superficial overview of the strategy.
It explores the strategy and its public face as
presented by DoD and addresses: What is the
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2.

3.

4.

5.

stated purpose of the strategy? What are its content and key messages?
Historical Context Analysis: The official roots
of the DoD cyber strategy go back more than
a decade, and this section reviews the document’s contents within the context of other key
historical national defense guidance. The section focuses on two questions: Is this strategy
consistent with previous strategies and current
policies? What unique contributions does it
introduce into the evolution of national security
cyberspace activities?
Traditional Strategy Analysis: This section evaluates eight specific premises for good strategies
that include the familiar elements of ends, ways,
means, and risk. It also addresses three questions: Does the strategy properly address specific DoD needs as well as broader U.S. ends? Is
the strategy appropriate and actionable? How
may joint combatant commanders view the
strategy?
Analysis of Subsequent DoD Action: This section
explores the DoD cyber strategy’s connections
and influences to DoD guidance that followed
its release. It will focus on two questions: How
are major military cyberspace components—
joint and Service—planning to implement the
goals and objectives of the DoD cyber strategy?
What plans has the Army put in place to support the strategy?
Whole of U.S. Government Analysis: This section examines DoD cyber activities from the perspective of a whole-of-government approach to
national cybersecurity. This analysis focuses on
two questions: Does the strategy support U.S.

Executive direction? Does the strategy integrate with other the cyberspace-related activities of other U.S. Government departments and
agencies?
This monograph concludes with a section that integrates the individual section findings and offers recommendations to improve future cyberspace strategic
planning documents.
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EVALUATION OF THE 2015 DOD CYBER
STRATEGY: MILD PROGRESS IN A COMPLEX
AND DYNAMIC MILITARY DOMAIN
In April 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD)
released its second official cyberspace strategy to update the 2011 Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and
to present strategic goals and associated implementation objectives to achieve three primary missions in
cyberspace: defend the DoD network, defend the United States and its interests, and develop cyber capabilities to support military operations. This monograph
assesses the value of the new strategy utilizing five
different frameworks of analysis: prima facie; historical context; traditional strategy elements; subsequent
DoD action; and whole-of-government approach. This
monograph focuses on events and documents from
the timeframe of about 1 year before and 1 year after
the 2015 strategy was released. This allows sufficient
time to examine the key policies and guidance that influenced the development of the strategy, as well as
follow-on activities for the impacts from the strategy.
This monograph serves as a primer to provide senior
policymakers, decision makers, military leaders, and
their respective staff with an overall appreciation for
complexities, challenges, opportunities, and risks associated with the development of military cyberspace
operations.
PRIMA FACIE ANALYSIS
Before delving into a detailed technical exploration
of the strategy, let us first examine it through the eyes
of a reader from the general public who may be unfamiliar with its background. Clearly, former Secretary
of Defense (SECDEF) Ashton Carter considered such
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an audience important when he stated that the strategy is “also a reflection of DoD being more open than
before” during his public unveiling of the document
at Stanford University.1 This section explores the strategy and its public face as presented by the DoD and
addresses the stated purpose of the strategy and its
content and key messages. This section is by intention
only a superficial overview of the strategy. Subsequent
sections will explore the broader context and assess
implications.
Purpose and Content
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy opens with a letter
from Carter that clearly establishes his personal stake
in the document—“I am invested in the success of this
strategy and I will hold the Department accountable
for meeting each goal and objective.”2 The letter also
explains why the strategy was developed:
The purpose of this cyber strategy, the Department’s second, is to guide the development of DoD’s cyber forces
and strengthen our cyber defense and cyber deterrence
posture. It focuses on building cyber capabilities and organizations for DoD’s three cyber missions: to defend
DoD networks; defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. national interested against cyberattacks of significant consequences; and support operational and contingency plans.3

The strategy, available for download from the official DoD website, is a 33-page document that is structured into 5 self-apparent main sections: Introduction,
Strategic Context, Strategic Goals, Implementation
Objectives, and Managing the Strategy, plus Carter’s
Prologue and a short Conclusion. The Introduction
and Implementation Objectives comprise the bulk
of the document (20 pages), and there are numerous
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redundancies throughout.4 The objectives are organized by their appropriate strategic goal, but there is
no clear priority or balance regarding how the content material is presented (see Appendix 1). Thus, one
may suspect that the document had different authors
for each subsection that were merged together rather
than integrated. The resulting collage of ideas and initiatives appears to be trying to cover all the bases vice
focusing on a prioritized approach of applying limited
resources to a boundless challenge. While these criticisms seem a bit pedantic to informed readers, the
shortfalls in writing structure and continuity unwittingly may serve to muddy the intended messages.
In addition to the full strategy document, the DoD
also posted a two-page fact sheet that presumably
presents the key messages that the department wanted
to communicate to the public. The fact sheet spells out
the three primary missions and strategic goals as well
as seemingly random examples of objectives. (Appendix 1 indicates which objectives were selected.) It cites
“three major drivers” for the new strategy: a more severe and sophisticated cyber threat; Presidential direction to defend against cyberattacks; and development
of the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). Consistent with the
full document, the fact sheet sets the scope for achieving the strategy as “the next 5 years and beyond.” It also
dedicates a paragraph each to other themes: “building
bridges to the private sector and beyond” and “deterrence is a key part of DoD’s new cyber strategy.”5 Indeed, these two topics receive significant coverage in
the strategy, but it is not evident why they were singled out in the fact sheet.
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Actions, Images, and Words
On April 23, 2015, Carter introduced his new cyber
strategy to the public as part of a lecture at Stanford
University in Palo Alto, California.6 The selection of
this venue in Silicon Valley, close to leading-edge technology and far away from Washington, DC, appeared
to be no accident. Carter’s speech focused on the history of successful technology partnering between the
DoD, the private sector, and research institutions; and
in the last quarter of it, he segued to cyberspace-related
topics culminating with the announcement of a new
strategy. His focus appeared to be tailored to the audience with many references to teamwork and cooperation, and asserted, “we have a unique opportunity to
build bridges and rebuild bridges and renew trust.”7
Citing a previously undisclosed Russian intrusion into
DoD networks, Carter made good on his claim in his
strategy prologue to “seek to be open and transparent
with the American people and the world about our
capabilities and plans.”8
To support the launch of the strategy, the DoD established a “Special Report” website that used links
and images to state the purpose of the strategy clearly,
as well as the three DoD primary cyber missions and
CMF concept. The website also provided links to the
document and fact sheet as well as links to the public
websites of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),
Army Cyber Command, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,
and Air Forces Cyber/24th Air Force. Perhaps most
importantly, under a picture of the strategy’s cover,
the website conveyed a clear civil-military chain of
command using pictures and statements of then-President Barack Obama, SECDEF Carter, and Commander, USCYBERCOM, Admiral Michael Rogers.9
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Missing from the chain was the commander, U.S. Strategic Command; this inconsistency is discussed later in
this monograph.
The strategy includes 18 images spread roughly
evenly throughout the document. Twelve of these are
photographs with captions and source credit, and the
other six are uncredited pictures that serve as background for section titles. A cursory review of these
graphics reveal that they focus almost exclusively on
themes related to the first and third primary missions
as well as the first and second strategic goals. (See
Appendix 2 for details.) The subjects of homeland defense, deterrence operations, and international partnerships are given short shrift in the visual communication realm of the strategy. An interesting artifact is
that 50 percent of the captioned images are credited to
U.S. Air Force (USAF) sources, and two of the section
headings depict USAF cyberspace operations centers.
From this, the uninformed reader may reasonably assume that the USAF is conducting the preponderance
of DoD cyberspace operations.
The strategy’s attempt to include external linkages
to some of its key themes was patchy in places. It did
a good job at identifying the explicit decision-making
roles of the President of the United States (POTUS)
and the SECDEF as well as references to the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) (still under development
at the time) and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). It also introduces the position of the Principal
Cyber Advisor to the SECDEF established by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014. However, it
provided only two passing mentions of the 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace,
neither of which provides an uninformed reader with
any significant background of what the DoD had been

5

doing in cyberspace prior to April 2015.10 Despite the
focus on deterrence and the CMF, the strategy makes
no mention of the development or practice of military
doctrine or theory.11
Summary
To a casual reader, the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy
starts off with a clear purpose and strong endorsement
statement from Carter. Thereafter, the DoD’s primary
missions and strategic goals are stated explicitly, but
the presentation of the context and implementation objectives is somewhat muddled with few specific details.
The document’s visual communication through captioned photographs provides little support for three of
the five strategic goals. The document’s conclusion devolves to a statement that offers no priorities and very
little material that is unique to the cyber domain.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT ANALYSIS
To understand better the content of the 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy, it is important to appreciate what has
preceded it. The document infers that it is only the second DoD strategy related to cyberspace, thus only having a history back to 2011. However, the official roots
of this strategy go back more than a decade and this
section reviews the document’s contents within the
context of other key historical national defense documents. This section focuses on two questions: Is this
strategy consistent with previous strategies and current policies? What unique contributions does it introduce into the evolution of national security cyberspace
activities?
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Comparison to Previous Cyberspace Strategies
In his publication, An Assessment of the Department of
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Dr. Thomas
Chen provides an excellent summary of the evolution
of cyberspace strategies from the 2003 Bush administration’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, through
the 2006 National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, and up to the 2011 DoD Strategy for Operating
in Cyberspace. Based on this historical background, he
then assesses each of the five strategic initiatives in the
2011 cyber strategy in terms of their significance and
novelty as well as their practicality.12
Rather than repeat Chen’s methodology, let us examine his observations and recommendations for their
relevance to the new strategy. Table 1 lists verbatim,
the strategic initiatives from the 2011 DoD cyberspace
strategy with the strategic goals of the 2015 DoD Cyber
Strategy. Several of Chen’s observations regarding the
2011 strategy remain valid in the 2015 version: a focus
on technology, resources, and cooperation; an emphasis on defense and prevention; and, mostly repeated
themes with no surprises or controversies.13 In fact,
one could argue that all of the 2011 strategic initiatives
provide the foundation for four of the 2015 strategic
goals: initiatives 1 and 5 for goal I; initiative 2 for goal
II; initiative 3 for goal III; and initiative 4 for goal V.
The remaining 2015 goal, IV, addresses new material to the public DoD cyber dialogue that is addressed
later in this section.
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DoD Strategy for
Operating in Cyberspace
(July 2011)
Strategic Initiatives 14

The DoD Cyber Strategy
(April 2015)
Strategic Goals 15

1.	Treat cyberspace as an
operational domain
to organize, train, and
equip so that DoD can
take full advantage of
cyberspace’s potential.
2. Employ new defense
operating concepts to
protect DoD networks
and systems.
3. Partner with other U.S.
Government departments and agencies
as well as the private
sector to enable a
whole-of-government
cybersecurity strategy.
4. Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and
international partners
to strengthen collective
cybersecurity.

I.	Build and maintain
ready forces and capabilities to conduct
cyberspace operations.

II.	Defend the DoD information network, secure
DoD data, and mitigate
risks to DoD missions.
III.	Be prepared to defend
the U.S. homeland and
U.S. vital interests from
disruptive or destructive cyberattacks of
significant consequence.
IV.	Build and maintain
viable cyber options
and plans to use those
options to control conflict escalation and to
shape the conflict environment at all stages.
V.	Build and maintain
robust alliances and
partnerships to deter
shared threats and
increase international
security and stability.

5. L
 everages the nation’s
ingenuity through an
exceptional cyber workforce and rapid technological innovation.

Table 1. Comparison of Themes of DoD Cyberspace
Strategies from 2011 and 2015.
8

The 2015 strategy did make progress in five areas
critiqued by Chen.16 First, he noted that the 2011 strategy did not distinguish between types of adversaries, where the 2015 strategy discusses cyber threats in
terms of state, nonstate, and criminal actors as well as
combinations of the three.17 However, the new strategy
still does not offer specific initiatives to address these
different adversaries.
Chen also noted that the 2011 strategy did not address offense, attribution, and implementation metrics. In the 2015 strategy, there is an explicit mention
of U.S. offensive cyber capability, but no amplifying
details are included.18 On the other hand, the subject
of attribution is discussed in great detail as a partnership between the DoD and the intelligence community
with contributions from the private sector.19 The new
strategy names specific countries that have threatened
the United States as well, and they will be addressed
later. The 2015 strategy calls for the DoD to “propose,
collect, and report a set of appropriate metrics to the
Principle Cyber Advisor to measure the operational
capacity of the CMF.”20
A final area of progress for the 2015 strategy addresses Chen’s observation that the 2011 strategy lacks
discussion on the “rules for proper response to cyber
attacks.”21 Part of the 2015 strategic goal IV requires
the DoD to “accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into plans,” and these plans “must outline and
define specific cyberspace effects against targets.”22
More importantly, the new strategy also provides the
philosophical unpinning that promulgates the lawful
performance of cyberspace activities:
To ensure that the Internet remains open, secure, and
prosperous, the United States will always conduct
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cyber operations under a doctrine of restraint, as required
to protect human lives and to prevent the destruction of
property. As in other domains of operations, in cyberspace the Defense Department will always act in a way
that reflects enduring U.S. values, including support for
the rule of law, as well as respect and protection of the
freedom of expression and privacy, the free flow of information, commerce, and ideas. Any decision to conduct
cyber operations outside of DoD networks is made with
the utmost care and deliberation and under strict policy
and operational oversight, and in accordance with the
law of armed conflict. As it makes its investments and
builds cyber capabilities to defend U.S. national interests,
the Defense Department will always be attentive to the
potential impact of defense policies on state and non-state
actors’ behavior.23

Ties to Current National Guidance
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy claims the “all of the
goals and objectives within this strategy reflect the
goals of the 2015 United States National Security Strategy
[NSS] and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR].”
An examination of the cyber-related excerpts from
these documents validates this assertion in general
terms, as illustrated with examples in Table 2 (see Appendix 3 for all relevant excerpts). Each of these purposeful documents dedicated a standalone paragraph
to cyberspace issues: “Cybersecurity” in the NSS24 and
“Cyber” in the QDR.25
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The DoD Cyber Strategy
(April 2015)
Strategic Goals 26
I. Build and maintain ready
forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations.

Supporting Excerpts from the
2015 NSS and the
2014 QDR 27
NSS (p. 8):
We will protect our investment in foundational capabilities like the nuclear deterrent,
and we will grow our investment in crucial capabilities
like cyber; space; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR].
QDR (p. 33):
The Department of Defense
will continue to invest in new
and expanded cyber capabilities, building on significant
progress made in recent years
in recruiting, training, and
retaining cyber personnel.
A centerpiece of our efforts
is the development of the
Department of Defense Cyber
Mission Force.

Table 2. Examples of Supporting Material for the
2015 DoD Cyberspace Strategy from Current
National Security Documents.
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II. Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD
data, and mitigate risks to
DoD missions.

NSS (p. 3):
We are fortifying our critical
infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage and attack.
QDR (pp. 14-15):
We must be able to defend the
integrity of our own networks,
protect our key systems and
networks, conduct effective
cyber operations overseas
when directed, and defend
the Nation from an imminent,
destructive cyberattack on
vital U.S. interests.

III. Be prepared to defend the
U.S. homeland and U.S. vital
interests from disruptive or
destructive cyberattacks of
significant consequence.

NSS (p. 12):
Drawing on the voluntary
cybersecurity framework, we
are securing federal networks
and working with the private
sector, civil society, and other
stakeholders to strengthen the
security and resilience of U.S.
critical infrastructure.
QDR (p. 15):
We support the Federal Government cybersecurity team
and will continue working
with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to
improve critical infrastructure
cybersecurity, and with DHS
and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to support law
enforcement activities.

Table 2. Examples of Supporting Material for the
2015 DoD Cyberspace Strategy from Current
National Security Documents. (cont.)
12

IV. Build and maintain viable
cyber options and plans to use
those options to control conflict escalation and to shape
the conflict environment at all
stages.

NSS (p. 13):
We will defend ourselves,
consistent with U.S. and
international law, against
cyber attacks and impose costs
on malicious cyber actors,
including through prosecution
of illegal cyber activity.
QDR (p. 14):
The Department of Defense
will deter, and when
approved by the President
and directed by the Secretary
of Defense, will disrupt and
deny adversary cyberspace
operations that threaten U.S.
interests.

V. Build and maintain robust
alliances and partnerships
to deter shared threats and
increase international security
and stability.

NSS (p. ii):
We are shaping global standards for cybersecurity and
building international capacity to disrupt and investigate
cyber threats.
QDR (p. 15):
Deterring and defeating cyber
threats requires a strong,
multi-stakeholder coalition that enables the lawful
application of the authorities,
responsibilities, and capabilities resident across the
U.S. Government, industry,
and international allies and
partners.

Table 2. Examples of Supporting Material for the
2015 DoD Cyberspace Strategy from Current
National Security Documents. (cont.)
13

A new version of the National Military Strategy
(NMS) followed the new cyber strategy about 2 months
later. Surprisingly, cyberspace activities received relatively little emphasis. While the NMS did pick up the
questionable party line regarding the North Korean
hack of Sony Picture Cyberspace, cyberspace activities
were not included as one of the 12 “Joint Force Prioritized Missions.”28 Further, the NMS did not dedicate
a paragraph to cyberspace issues, and the text did not
have any hint of linkage to the third primary mission in
cyberspace (see Appendix 3 for all relevant excerpts).
Simply put, the 2015 NMS presented military cyberspace activities as a step backward in the priority from
the 2014 QDR and 2015 NSS.
A major theme missing from the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy is the DoD Defense Innovation Initiative,
more commonly referred to as the Third Offset Strategy.29 The absence of this term is peculiar since Carter
mentioned the concept of an offset strategy as part of
his speech introducing the new cyber strategy.30 Also,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work clearly identified investment in cyber capabilities as an integral part
of the Third Offset Strategy during a public speech in
January 2015.31 Inclusion of the Defense Innovation Initiative as part of the implementation objectives would
strengthen significantly the linkage of the cyber strategy’s strategic goal I to the larger DoD priorities.
Summary
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy does not contain any
significant historical context regarding actions and
accomplishments since the 2011 strategy. In fact, the
2015 strategy’s five strategic goals remain largely
unchanged from the 2011 strategy’s five Strategic
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Initiatives. Fortunately, the 2015 strategy’s content is
grounded firmly in guidance from the President via
the 2015 NSS as well as from the SECDEF via the 2014
QDR. However, unlike the QDR and NSS, the 2015
NMS released shortly after the cyber strategy did not
contain any unique content regarding cyberspace and
did not list it among the prioritized joint missions.
The cyber strategy appears to stay true to its 5-year
scope of vision and does not discuss either any anticipated dynamics or changes of the cyberspace domain
beyond 2020.
TRADITIONAL STRATEGY ANALYSIS
Having established a basic understanding of the
basic structure and historical context of the 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy, we will now evaluate it using traditional criteria for U.S. military strategy. The model for our
analysis is that utilized by the U.S. Army War College
(USAWC) that focuses on eight specific premises for
good strategies that include the familiar elements of
ends, ways, means, and risk. This section addresses
three questions: Does the strategy properly address
specific DoD needs as well as broader U.S. ends? Is the
strategy appropriate and actionable? How may joint
combatant commanders view the strategy?
Grading the Strategy
There is no magic formula or standardized yardstick to determine the virtues of a given strategy. We
will adopt a framework for our analysis that has decades of successful application in the USAWC curriculum. This model defines strategy as “the employment
of the instruments (elements) of power (political/
diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to
15

achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their
own objectives.”32 The model asserts that an effective
strategy will achieve eight premises in its content and
character: proactive and anticipatory; clear end state;
appropriate balance of ends-ways-means; political
purpose dominates; hierarchical; comprehensive in
context; knowledge and analysis of environment; and
consideration of risk as potential for failure.33 Table 3
provides a visual summary of whether the 2015 DoD
Cyber Strategy achieved, partially achieved, or failed
to achieve each of these eight premises. Discussion to
support each of these asserted evaluations follows.

Table 3. Evaluation of Strategy Premises.
Proactive and Anticipatory?
Score: Partially achieved. While strategic goal
IV does call for the integration of cyber options into
plans to support the proactive role of shaping the conflict environment, the strategy provides little details
16

except that this integration needs to be accelerated.
Otherwise, most of the objectives center on establishing
and monitoring defensive perimeters around the DoD
networks and establishing partnerships that should already exist. While some progress is being made, the
rate of growth of strategy maturation is far less than
rate of growth of cyberspace. The Internet population
alone has grown by almost a billion users—about a 43
percent increase—since the 2011 DoD Cyber Strategy
was released.34
Clear End State?
Score: Not Achieved. As discussed previously, the
2015 strategy provides excellent linkage to national security objectives as well as the U.S. goals and interests
related to cyberspace. However, there is no clear end
state expressed in the document’s introduction or conclusion, and the sum of the five strategic goals does not
equal an end state. The failure to achieve this critical element of communication is demonstrated by the overall weak language related to cyberspace in follow-on
2015 National Military Strategy.
Appropriate Balance as an Integrated Whole?
Score: Partially achieved. Although the strategy
does not use the terminology of the ends-ways-means
model in its text, it does address each of these elements
conceptually. Table 4 provides examples of content in
the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy that support the model.
This material is presented with no discussion on how
they will be prioritized or integrated across the strategy writ large to assess potential gaps between “what
is to be achieved and the concepts and resources available to achieve the objective.”35
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Ends
What is being accomplished?

Ways
How is it being accomplished?

Means
What resources are being used?

•	Three primary DoD missions in cyberspace.
•	U.S. vital interests in
cyberspace.
• U.S. core values.
•	Implement five strategic
goals.
•	Integrated and synchronized operations.
•	Deterrence and doctrine of
constraint.
• Cyber Mission Force.
•	Joint Information
Environment.
•	Joint Force Headquarters for
DoD information operations
(JFHQ-DODIN).

Table 4. Examples of Ends, Ways, and Means
in the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy.
The element of ends—what is being accomplished
by the strategy—is addressed by the three primary DoD missions in cyberspace as well as by some of
the national interests that they ultimately serve. Vital
U.S. interests in cyberspace include “an open, secure,
interoperable, and reliable Internet that enables prosperity, public safety, and the free flow of commerce
and ideas.”36 According to the strategy, these interests
“reflect core American values—of freedom of expression and privacy, creativity, opportunity, and innovation.”37
The element of ways—how the strategy is being
accomplished—includes processes described by the

18

five strategic goals. These processes emphasize the cyberspace operations that are integrated and synchronized with joint planning and operations working to
form “the larger multi-mission U.S. military force to
achieve synergy across domains.”38 In the subsequent
DoD support for this notion, cyberspace operations receive significant attention in the 2016 joint staff planner’s guide for cross-domain operations.39 The strategy
also emphasizes the incorporation of cyberspace operations into U.S. deterrence activities that include components of response, denial, and resiliency.40 Finally,
when the strategy calls for the judicious use of military
cyberspace it means:
to ensure that the Internet remains open, secure, and
prosperous, the United States will always conduct cyber operations under a doctrine of restraint, as required
to protect human lives and to prevent the destruction of
property.41

The element of means—what resources are being
used for the strategy—emphasizes personnel and infrastructure. The CMF is the linchpin for future DoD
operations in cyberspace. The force is organized into
133 teams developed and trained for 4 task areas: defense of the network; national defense; combatant commander support; or general cyberspace support.42 The
strategy stresses that the success of the CMF depends
on its ability to work with members of joint, interagency, international, and private sector teams. Although
the strategy did address Joint Force Headquarters-DoD
Information Networks (JFHQ-DODIN), it failed to
mention the other three joint force headquarters designated to support specific combatant commands.43 The
infrastructure backbone for many DoD cyberspace
operations will utilize the Joint Information Environ-
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ment single security architecture which is designed to
“enable a robust network defense and shift the focus
from protecting service-specific networks and systems
to securing the DoD enterprise in a unified manner.”44
To help coordinate the implementation of resources
and program management for the DoD cyberspace activities, the strategy acknowledges the congressionally-directed requirement to establish the new position
of Principal Cyber Advisor to the SECDEF.45
Does Political Purpose Dominate?
Score: Achieved. The strategy does an excellent
job in establishing the U.S. constitutional tenet mandating the primacy of civilian control of military operations. The prelude to the introduction of the three
primary missions in cyberspace captures this concept
eloquently:
The President has established principles and processes
for governing cyber operations. The purpose of these
principles and processes is to plan, develop, and use U.S.
capabilities effectively, and to ensure that cyber operations occur in a manner consistent with the values that
the United States promotes domestically and internationally.46

Further, the strategy also states that the President
and SECDEF will direct the assessment of significant
cyberattacks, the conduct of military cyberspace operations, and the delivery of public statements regarding
cyberspace designed to enhance U.S. deterrence.47
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Is It Hierarchical—Does It Cascade from National Level
Down?
Score: Achieved. The last section’s analysis of the
strategy’s linkage to national security documents revealed that the three primary DoD cyberspace missions
and all the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy strategic goals have
traceable foundations to the 2014 QDR and 2015 NSS.
Also, the strategy clearly decrees policy alignment
with presidential guidance:
Consistent with presidential guidance, DoD will align
and simplify its cyber operations and cybersecurity policy management and identified gaps, overlaps, seams,
conflicts, and areas in need of revision in current documentation.48

Is It Comprehensive in Consideration of Context?
Score: Partially achieved. The strategy does include a four-page section, “Strategic Context,” that describes key cyber threats, malware proliferation, risk
to DoD networks and infrastructure, and deterrence
as well as an introduction that explains U.S. cybersecurity activities, DoD cyberspace missions, and the
cyber mission force.49 However, these discussions do
not mention critical DoD stakeholders in cyberspace,
such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). There is
no background provided to portray how the domain
of cyberspace itself has changed since 2011—that is,
the changes in its size in terms of users, devices, servers, data transfer rates, global memory capacities, and
so forth. Perhaps of more concern is the dearth of material regarding the theory or doctrine of cyberspace
operations.
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Thorough Analysis and Knowledge of the Strategic
Situation/Environment?
Score: Partially achieved. In its section on Implementation Objectives, the strategy does discuss many
internal and external factors that influence and have an
impact on the strategic goals. However, it falls short of
providing the specific examples, quantitative trends,
and demographics necessary to analyze properly the
magnitudes and directions of such influences. To its
credit, the strategy forgoes the tired “cyber Pearl Harbor” admonishment. However, it only provides one
explicit account of a cyberattack—the 2014 hack of
Sony Picture attributed to North Korea and described
as “one of the most destructive cyberattacks on a U.S.
entity to date.”50 Perhaps the characterization of this
example is a bit melodramatic in light of the costly
compromises by Edward Snowden, the systematic
theft of U.S. intellectual property by China, or even the
mysterious Russian intrusion into the DoD networks
revealed by Carter at the launch of the 2015 DoD Cyber
Strategy.51
Consider Risk as Potential for Strategy to Fail?
Score: Partially achieved. The strategy is replete
with references to risks from outside forces and entities
that threaten cyberspace infrastructure and operations.
Furthermore, the strategy proposes that “to mitigate
these and other risks and improve U.S. national security, this strategy sets strategic goals for the Department
to achieve, and prescribes objectives and metrics for
meeting each goal.”52 This methodology of risk mitigation is presented in a piecemeal manner throughout
the Implementation Objective, but risk is not discussed
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at the enterprise level of the overall strategy. That is,
the strategy does not explain how it will prioritize and
balance its ends, ways, and means best to reduce the
risk of failure.
Summary
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy addressed most of
the premises of traditional military strategy to some
degree, but failed to provide the most important element--a clear end state. This deficiency stifles any prioritization of effort and allows some of the goals and
objectives to be interpreted or manipulated to suit or
appease the purposes of many audiences. The strategy does an excellent job at stressing its subjugation
to higher U.S. civilian authorities and their guidance.
This strict adherence may hamper the strategy’s ability to be proactive and anticipatory, thus making it a
cautious and comfortable work at times that merely
repeats the party line.
While the complexities of military cyberspace operations make it difficult for The DoD Cyber Strategy to
provide a comprehensive context in a concise document, there should at least be some discussion of the
theory and doctrine that form the foundation of these
operations; this was not the case. The strategy did not
fully describe the existing domain of cyberspace, and it
did not analyze what changes may occur to its size and
structure over the next 5 years.
While The DoD Cyber Strategy did include some
general concepts that support an ends-ways-means
paradigm, it did not provide any specific information
that made it actionable. This dearth of detail on basic
U.S. military cyberspace command and control structures diminishes its value to combatant commanders
and their staffs.
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ANALYSIS OF SUBSEQUENT DOD ACTION
Having examined the contents of the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy and its linkages to national security planning documents that preceded it, we now explore the
strategy’s connections and influences to DoD guidance
that followed its release. This section will focus on two
questions: How are major military cyberspace components—joint and Service—planning to implement
the goals and objectives of The DoD Cyber Strategy?
What plans has the Army put in place to support the
strategy?
USCYBERCOM Implementation
Less than 2 months after the release of the 2015
DoD Cyber Strategy, Admiral Rogers, Commander,
USCYBERCOM, issued his vision and guidance document, Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through
Cyberspace.53 Although his introductory letter directly
ties this guidance to the DoD strategy, the content that
follows is disappointing for anyone seeking details beyond generic slogans. Its central themes—“motivated
by mission; powered by partnerships; oriented toward
outcomes—we have a global mission that matters and
an opportunity to serve our nation every day”54—offer
nothing unique to the command or DoD cyberspace
activities. The product does mention several key topics
not found in the DoD strategy—ties to the NSA and
the DISA, development of doctrine, and the fact that
cyberspace is not a static domain in its size. It also includes a hierarchy of missions, imperatives, and enablers as summarized in Figure 1. Yet, these artifacts
lack the practicality, priority, and precise language to
yield any actionable guidance. One must ask, if the
word “cyber” and “cyberspace” were removed from
24

Figure 1, could the remaining verbiage apply to any
DoD organization?55

Figure 1. Summary of Themes from
The Commander’s Vision and Guidance for
U.S. Cyber Command (June 2015).56
A more credible and actionable communique from
Rogers is his congressional testimony in April 2016, a
1-year update of his USCYBERCOM vision.57 While
the threat landscape of named adversaries remained
the same, other cyberspace incidents besides the Sony
hack were presented—the theft of the personal infor25

mation of over 21 million Americans via compromised
computers at the Office of Personnel Management, as
well as the December 2015 cyberattack on Ukraine’s
power grid.58 With regard to the means necessary to
fulfill USCYBERCOM missions, Rogers noted that
his command received a $466 million budget for FY
2016 and that the CMF development stood at 123 of
133 teams formed. He noted progress in several areas
critical to CMF operations: training, sustainment, capabilities, innovation, and culture. He acknowledged
the role that Third Offset Strategy would play in his
command:
USCYBERCOM stands ready to help develop and deploy
the new cyber capabilities entailed in the Third Offset,
particularly hardened command and control networks
and autonomous countermeasures to cyber attacks.

He also expressed his gratitude for being granted limited authority by the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2016 as a Command Acquisition Executive.59
Ideally, this will improve the speed and agility of procuring capabilities for the command.
Derivative Strategic Planning Documents
Two significant DoD initiatives followed the 2015
DoD Cyber Strategy to address resource management
issues of improving the integrity of the network infrastructure and personnel operating on it. First, the DoD
Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan was
developed in October 2015 to help achieve The DoD
Cyber Strategy Strategic Goal II (defend the DoD information network). Its stated purpose is “to mitigate
risks and operationalize cyber readiness reporting for
the information systems they own, manage, or lease
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for mission assurance through DRRS [Defense Readiness Reporting System].”60 The implementation plan is
a very actionable document and includes appendices
that codify priorities, sequence of tasks, and traceability of the plan’s requirements with overarching DoD
cybersecurity requirements.61 Second, the DoD Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative (DC3I)
was directed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Martin Dempsey and SECDEF Carter in September 2015 to “transform DoD cybersecurity culture
by improving individual human performance and accountability in mutual support of The DoD Cyber Strategy.”62 It also supports Strategic Goal II by establishing
five operational excellence principles—Integrity, Level
of Knowledge, Procedural Compliance, Formality and
Backup, and a Questioning Attitude—to be inculcated
across the DoD cyber enterprise. The DC3I identifies
four distinct groups within the enterprise—leaders,
provider, cyber warriors, and users—and 11 shortterm tasks to make the initiative actionable.63
In his April 2016 congressional testimony, Rogers
noted that “USCYBERCOM comprises a headquarters organization and seven components: the Cyber
National Mission Force, the Joint Force Headquarters-DoD Information Networks, plus joint force headquarters and growing forces,” which are part of the
individual Service cyber commands as well as that of
the Coast Guard.64 Each of these USCYBERCOM components has published strategy-planning documents
with mostly implicit linkage to the 2015 DoD Cyber
Strategy. The titles of these documents are summarized
in Table 5 with excerpts that describe the purpose or
focus of the work. The reader should note that these
documents are available on official public websites,
and thus some of these papers may not be under the
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direct purview of the component. While it is beyond
the scope of this monograph to analyze these works
in detail, it is apparent from a cursory review that the
focus of the documents aligns with existing organizational and Service cultures and what they can contribute to joint operations. While many of them include
strategic goals, none of them had direct reference to
the strategic goals of the DoD strategy.
USCYBERCOM
Strategic Planning Document
Component Affected
Cyber National
DoD Cyberspace Workforce Strategy (December
Mission Force
2013):
This document is the Department’s strategy
for transforming its cyberspace workforce of
military (active/reserve) and civilian personnel and includes approaches to recruit, train,
and retain staff in a competitive national
environment. Additionally, many of the
principles and tenets within this document
will hold true for the contract services supporting the Department’s cyberspace workforce personnel. Successful execution of
this cyberspace workforce strategy requires
coordinated action across the Department,
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
agencies, industry partners, and academia,
while keeping Congress informed.65

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents.
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Joint Force
Headquarters-DoD
Information
Networks

Defense Information Systems Agency Strategic Plan 2015-2020 (June 2015):
We will continue to lead the DoD cyberspace
and information technology optimization
efforts. This includes eliminating Department duplication of effort, capitalizing on
the range of commercial cloud solutions,
and maintaining the operational cyberspace
integrity of the DoDIN services we defend,
operate, and assure. Our agile enterprise
will emphasize on-demand, real-time, 24x7,
secure access and availability.
Over the next several months, DISA will:
• Evolve the JFHQ-DODIN
• Deploy and operationalize the Joint
Regional Security Stacks (JRSS) platform
• Continue to implement our reorganization
• Maintain our superior delivery of capability to our mission partners
• Enhance mobility and collaboration
capabilities.66

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents. (cont.)
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Army Cyber/Second Army Network Campaign Plan: 2020 & Beyond
Army
(February 2015):
This campaign plan supports mission readiness by providing the vision and direction
that set conditions for and lay a path to
Network 2020 and Beyond, thereby unifying
efforts to provide a modern network that
meets the Army’s warfighting and business
needs, today and tomorrow.
The network envisioned spans all Army
operations, from administrative operations
in garrison to the most forward-deployed
soldier at the tactical edge. Army users
expect to access the network securely at the
point of need—and that the network will
deliver. For this reason, the network must
be highly responsive, providing the information necessary to execute decisive actions
anytime, anywhere and on any device. It also
must enable command posts to be mobile,
agile, modular, scalable and survivable in
support of continuous mission command to
win in the complex world in which the Army
operates.67

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents. (cont.)
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Marine Forces
Cyberspace

Marine Corps Concept for Cyberspace Operations (October 2015):

Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet

Addresses the cyberspace capabilities the
Marine Corps will need to support missions
as part of a joint force and meet requirements
of the combatant commanders. It stresses
that commanders must integrate cyberspace
capabilities into the operational plans across
the warfighting functions and domains, and
shows that integration and synchronization
of cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum operations will be critical to mission
success.68
U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet Strategic Plan 2015-2020 (May 2015):
This strategic plan emphasizes the warfighting aspects of this command―both offensive
and defensive―while still recognizing the
significant ways in which other warfighters
rely on our effectiveness in the confluence of
cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum,
and space.69

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents. (cont.)
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Air Force Information Dominance Flight Plan:
Air Forces
Cyber/24th Air Force The Way Forward for Cyberspace IT in the United
States Air Force (May 2015):
Aligns the strategies and objectives of the
Air Force and DoD, to include the DoD
Cyber Strategy and the Air Force’s Strategic
Master Plan (SMP). This plan refocuses our
Cyber workforce on executing, enhancing,
and supporting Air Force core missions.
This change in focus is critical as it strengthens our understanding of how cyberspace/
Information Technology (IT) capabilities
contribute to overall DoD operations and
encourages the rapid development and integration of Air Force IT/cyberspace capabilities in support of joint warfighters and in the
face of real and dangerous cyber threats to
our core missions.70

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents. (cont.)
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U.S. Coast Guard
Cyber

U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Strategy (June 2015):
To operate effectively within the cyber
domain, and to counter and protect against
maritime cyber threats over the next decade,
the Coast Guard’s Cyber Strategy emphasizes three strategic priorities: Defending
Cyberspace, Enabling Operations, and Protecting Infrastructure.
This Strategy provides a framework for the
Coast Guard’s efforts in the cyber domain
over the next 10 years, which will be essential to ensuring our Nation’s security and
prosperity in the maritime environment.
This framework will enable success across
all Coast Guard mission areas and will support all aspects of our “Prevent-Respond”
core operational concept. It is aligned with
current governing Executive directives, policies, and laws, including . . . the DoD Cyber
Strategy of 2015.71

Table 5. Derivative Strategic Planning Documents. (cont.)
The Army has published several cyberspace-planning documents that address not only the 5-year scope
of the DoD strategy but also ones that look decades into
the future.72 In an article addressing the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy, Lieutenant General Robert Ferrell, Army
Chief Information Officer/G-6 (CIO/G-6), noted that
the Army’s role in implementing the strategy requires
a coordinated team effort within the department:
To shape acquisition and resourcing strategies and to
help build next generation cyber capabilities, our Army
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team has a partnership between the U.S. Army Cyber
Command/Second Army, HQDA G-2, HQDA G/3-5-7,
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, the Program Executive Offices
and the CIO/G6. This enhanced partnership will help
provide our forces flexible options to shape and dominate
the cyberspace domain.73

As identified in Table 5, the Army Network Campaign Plan sets the stage by defining lines of effort to
achieve network end states. This foundation plan is
augmented by more detailed implementation guidance documents that distinguish primary and supporting efforts and define priority activities for near-term
(2016-2017)74 and mid-term (2018-2022).75
In March 2016, the CIO/G-6 released Shaping the
Army Network: 2025-2040 to provide the long-term strategic direction with six focus areas: dynamic transport;
computing and edge sensors; data to decisive action;
human cognition enhancement; robotics and autonomous operations; and cybersecurity and resiliency.76
These focus areas represent a more holistic view of
possible future operations in and through cyberspace.
To help make the guidance actionable, the document
includes a matrix to indicate its alignment with joint
capability areas. It also provides a summary chart that
identifies the ends-ways-means strategy to support the
envisioned mission command network.77 Other critical
supporting strategies include the Army Cloud Computing Strategy (March 2015)78 and the Army Data Strategy
(February 2016)79 as well as the U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence Strategic Plan (September 2015), which
addresses how the center will lead efforts to “develop
concepts, doctrine, requirements, integrate cyberspace
operations and train Soldiers and leaders.”80
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Summary
All major components of USCYBERCOM have released strategic planning products that complement
the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. As may be expected, these
documents often reflect Service-specific approaches,
resources, and biases. The Army appears to have a
good set of supporting strategies in place that include
not only near-term guidance for Army cyber operations but also long-term guidance out to 2040. Unfortunately, the USCYBERCOM Commander’s Vision
and Guidance is heavy on jargon and light on actionable detail—it reads more like a marketing brochure
than a serious work of strategic planning. The commander’s testimonies before Congress provide much
better insight into the current and future activities of
USCYBERCOM.
WHOLE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT ANALYSIS
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy avers that when conducting military cyberspace operations,
the Defense Department cooperates with agencies of the
U.S. Government with the private sector, and with our international partners to share information, build alliances
and partnerships, and foster norms of responsible behavior to improve global strategic stability.81

This section examines this claim by analyzing the DoD’s
cyber activities from the perspective of a whole-of-government approach to national cybersecurity. This analysis focuses on two questions: Does the strategy support U.S. Executive direction? Does the strategy integrate with other cyberspace-related activities of other
U.S. Government departments and agencies?
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Executive Direction
The Obama administration clearly advocated for
a whole-of-government approach to U.S. national cybersecurity and put it at the top of its list of principles
to employ to the cybersecurity challenge along with
“network defense first . . . protection of privacy and
civil liberties . . . public-private collaboration . . . [and]
international cooperation and engagement.”82 Indeed,
the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy includes several references to these principles in its Strategic Context and Implementation Objectives chapters. Previous sections of
this monograph explored how The DoD Cyber Strategy
is linked to national security plans and strategies—
documents that are more philosophical than directive.
We now look at directives, laws, and implementation
activities that require action from the DoD (and other
parts of the U.S. Federal Government) to turn the various strategies into reality.
The Obama administration also listed five cybersecurity priorities in addition to its employment principles. Table 6 compares these priorities with the five
strategic goals from the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy and
provides examples of recent Executive direction that
affect DoD activities. There is excellent alignment between concepts in the presidential priorities and those
in the DoD’s cyber strategic goals, although their order
of presentation is different. A review of the details in
the examples of Executive direction reveals the common themes of interagency teamwork as well as partnership with private sector to coordinate cyber incident responses and implement data sharing.
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The DoD Cyber
Strategy (April 2015)
Strategic Goals83
I. Build and maintain
ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace
operations.

Obama Administration Cybersecurity
Priority 84 and Supporting Executive Direction
5. Shaping a cyber-savvy workforce and moving
beyond passwords in partnership with the private
sector.
•
Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy (July

2016)
An OPM-led team recommended that NIST,
DoD, and DHS convene to determine what
actions are required for each work role with a
specific interest on major talent gaps for both
federal employees and contractor employees,
in order to fully utilize the existing retention and talent development opportunities.
Enterprise-wide workforce planning includes
efforts to incorporate certifications and
training opportunities so that cybersecurity
professionals remain knowledgeable about
emerging trends in their area(s) of responsibility, with these and other professional
development opportunities serving as retention strategies.85

Table 6. Linkage of Presidential Direction
to the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy.
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II. Defend the DoD information network, secure
DoD data, and mitigate
risks to DoD missions.

4. Securing federal networks by setting clear security
targets and holding agencies accountable for meeting
those targets.
• Executive Order 13718 “Commission on Enhancing
National Cybersecurity” (February 2016)
The Commission will make detailed recommendations to strengthen cybersecurity in
both the public and private sectors while
protecting privacy, ensuring public safety
and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships
between federal, state, and local government
and the private sector in the development,
promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices.86
• Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan
(CSIP) for the Federal Government (October 2015)
Strengthening the cybersecurity of federal
networks, systems and data is one of the most
important challenges we face as a Nation. As
a result, the Federal Government is bringing
significant resources to bear to ensure cybersecurity remains a top priority. This includes
strengthening government-wide processes for
developing, implementing, and institutionalizing best practices; developing and retaining
the cybersecurity workforce; and working
with public and private sector research and
development communities to leverage the best
of existing, new, and emerging technology.87

Table 6. Linkage of Presidential Direction
to the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. (cont.)
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III. Be prepared to defend
the U.S. homeland and
U.S. vital interests from
disruptive or destructive
cyberattacks of significant
consequence.

1. Protecting the country’s critical infrastructure―our
most important information systems—from cyber
threats.
•
Executive Order 13691 “Promoting Private Sector
Cybersecurity Information Sharing” (February 2015)
Organizations engaged in the sharing of
information related to cybersecurity risks
and incidents play an invaluable role in the
collective cybersecurity of the United States.
The purpose of this order is to encourage the
voluntary formation of such organizations, to
establish mechanisms to continually improve
the capabilities and functions of these organizations, and to better allow these organizations to partner with the Federal Government
on a voluntary basis.88
•
Executive Order 13636 “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” (February 2013)
To assist the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure in protecting their systems from
unauthorized access, exploitation, or harm, the
Secretary [of Homeland Security], consistent
with 6 U.S.C. 143 and in collaboration with the
Secretary of Defense, shall, within 120 days of
the date of this order, establish procedures to
expand the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services
program to all critical infrastructure sectors.
This voluntary information sharing program
will provide classified cyber threat and technical information from the Government to
eligible critical infrastructure companies or
commercial service providers that offer security services to critical infrastructure.89

Table 6. Linkage of Presidential Direction
to the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. (cont.)
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IV. Build and maintain
viable cyber options and
plans to use those options
to control conflict escalation and to shape the
conflict environment at all
stages.

2. Improving our ability to identify and report cyber
incidents so that we can respond in a timely manner.
•
PPD-41 “United States Cyber Incident Coordination” (July 2016)
This Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) sets
forth principles governing the Federal Government’s response to any cyber incident,
whether involving government or private
sector entities. For significant cyber incidents,
this PPD also establishes lead federal agencies and an architecture for coordinating the
broader Federal Government response. It
also requires the Departments of Justice and
Homeland Security to maintain updated contact information for public use to assist entities affected by cyber incidents in reporting
those incidents to the proper authorities.90
•
Executive Order 13694 “Blocking the Property of
Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious
Cyber-Enabled Activities” (April 2015)
All property and interests in property that are
in the United States . . . of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred,
paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt
in . . . any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State,
to be responsible for or complicit in, or to
have engaged in, directly or indirectly, cyber
enabled activities originating from, or directed
by persons located, in whole or in substantial
part, outside the United States that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national
security, foreign policy, or economic health or
financial stability of the United States.91

Table 6. Linkage of Presidential Direction
to the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. (cont.)
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V. Build and maintain
robust alliances and partnerships to deter shared
threats and increase
international security and
stability.

3. Engaging with international partners to promote
internet freedom and build support for an open,
interoperable, secure, and reliable cyberspace.
• Executive Order 13687 “Imposing Additional Sanctions with Respect to North Korea” (January 2015)
I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United
States of America, find that the provocative,
destabilizing, and repressive actions and
policies of the Government of North Korea,
including its destructive, coercive cyber-related actions during November and December 2014, actions in violation of UNSCRs 1718,
1874, 2087, and 2094, and commission of serious human rights abuses, constitute a continuing threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States, and
hereby expand the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of
June 26, 2008, expanded in scope in Executive
Order 13551 of August 30, 2010, and relied
upon for additional steps in Executive Order
13570 of April 18, 2011.92
•
International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity,
Security, and Openness in a Networked World (May
2011)
When warranted, the United States will
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we
would to any other threat to our country. All
states possess an inherent right to self-defense,
and we recognize that certain hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel
actions under the commitments we have with
our military treaty partners. We reserve the
right to use all necessary means—diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic—as
appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our
Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests. In so doing, we will exhaust all options
before military force whenever we can; will
carefully weigh the costs and risks of action
against the costs of inaction; and will act in a
way that reflects our values and strengthens
our legitimacy, seeking broad international
support whenever possible.93

Table 6. Linkage of Presidential Direction
to the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy. (cont.)
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A comprehensive summary of cybersecurity–related legislative actions compiled by the Congressional
Research Service noted, “despite many recommendations made over the past decade, most major legislative provisions relating to cybersecurity had been enacted prior to 2002.”94 This drought of congressional
legislation ended within months of the 2015 DoD Cyber
Strategy release as the 113th Congress passed five major
bills in December 2014 and the 114th Congress passed
a four-part cybersecurity division within the Consolidated Appropriations Act in December 2015.95 Most of
these laws emphasize interagency efforts to pursue national cybersecurity activities that include information
sharing and voluntary inclusion of the private sector.
In concert with these numerous cybersecurity laws,
President Obama initiated the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) in February 2016 that includes
near- and long-term activities:
to enhance cybersecurity awareness and protections, protect privacy, maintain public safety as well as economic
and national security, and empower Americans to take
better control of their digital security.96

Specific CNAP actions include the establishment of
a Commission of Enhancing National Cybersecurity
(see Executive Order 13718 in Table 6) and two proposed budget increases for fiscal year (FY) 2017: $3.1
billion for an Information Technology Modernization
Fund as part of an overall federal cybersecurity funding amount of $19 billion (over 35 percent more than
FY 2016).97 It is unclear if any of these increases will be
allocated to the DoD’s activities.
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The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy infers that federal
budget trends may negatively impact strategy implementation:
Although DoD has prioritized the allocation of resources
in its budget to develop cyber capabilities, continued fiscal uncertainty requires that DoD plan to build its cyber
capabilities under a declining overall defense budget.98

In fact, a congressional fact sheet on the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act asserts that the budget fully resources and authorizes USCYBERCOM,
Service cyber commands, and cyber science and technology initiatives.99 Further, the DoD budget request
for FY 2017 included $6.7 billion for “strengthening cyber defenses and increasing options available in case
of a cyber-attack.”100 The DoD Comptroller asserts that
such funding is sufficient to execute the 2015 cyber
strategy, support the CMF, and develop offensive cyber capabilities.101
Interdepartmental and Interagency Efforts
Coordination and interaction in support of cyberspace-related goals among federal agencies within the
U.S. Government has occurred continuously for more
than a decade. As stressed in the presidential direction,
congressional acts, and the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy,
a significant portion of these activities center on the
three key themes of cyber incident handling, information sharing, and private-public partnerships.
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Cyber Incident Handling
The formal coordination of national cyber incidents
goes back at least as far as 2010, when three important
events occurred: the completion of a Memorandum of
Agreement between the DoD and the DHS, which included the establishment of the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC); the
release of the interim version of the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP); and the establishment
of Cyber Storm exercises to test and refine NCIRP processes.102 Although evolutionary progress was made
over the intervening years, no new NCIRP was ever
published.
On July 2016, Obama released Presidential Policy
Directive 41 (PPD-41), “United States Cyber Incident
Coordination.”103 This directive provides principles
for handling incident response—which include unity
of government effort—and the three concurrent lines
of effort for response activities. The lines of effort are
threat response activities led by the Department of Justice (DoJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); asset
response activities led by DHS; and intelligence support and related activities led by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). PPD-41 differentiates between routine and significant cyber events,
with the latter being the focus of Federal Government
actions:
While the vast majority of cyber incidents can be handled
through existing policies, certain cyber incidents that
have significant impacts on an entity, our national security, or the broader economy require a unique approach
to response efforts. These significant cyber incidents demand unity of effort within the Federal Government and
especially close coordination between the public and private sectors.104
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The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy also uses the notion
of “cyberattacks of significant consequence” in its description of the second DoD mission.105 When a significant cyber event has been identified officially, PPD-41
calls for a Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG)
that:
shall serve as the primary method for coordinating between and among federal agencies in response to a significant cyber incident as well as for integrating private
sector partners into incident response efforts, as appropriate.106

Existing DoD cyber incident roles and responsibilities
are codified in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Manual (CJCSM) 6510.01B (July 10, 2012), Cyber Incident Handling Program, a manual that “specifies its
major processes, implementation requirements, and
related U.S. Government interactions.”107 The manual includes several concepts found in PPD-41, such as
the Cyber UCG (p. F-6) and work with DHS and other federal agencies under the role of Defense Support
of Civil Authorities (DSCA) (p. A-5).108 One challenge
noted in the CJCSM is that the DoD and the DHS have
different categorization systems for cyber incidents, although the goal is to agree to common definitions.109
Per PPD-41, the DoD will participate in the Cyber
Response Group (CRG), which will “coordinate the
development and implementation of the Federal Government’s policies, strategies, and procedures for responding to significant cyber incidents” as well as resolve issues elevated to it by subordinate bodies (such
as a Cyber UCG) and coordinate communications
strategies for significant cyber incidents.110 PPD-41
maintains the DoD as the sector-specific agency (SSA)
for significant cyber incidents affecting the Defense
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Industrial Base (DIB) as well as SECDEF as the federal
lead “for managing the threat and asset response to cyber incidents affecting the DoD Information Network,
including restoration activities, with support from
other federal agencies as appropriate.”111
For other agencies, PPD-41 calls for incorporation
of cyber incident response into training and exercise
programs by each SSA. It directs the DHS and DoJ to
lead the SSAs to develop a new concept of operations
that “shall further develop how the Cyber UCG and
field elements of the federal coordination architecture
will work in practice for significant cyber incidents.”112
This concept of operations should fulfill some of the
requirements of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
Finally, PPD-41 directs the development of a new
National Cyber Incident Response Plan lead by DHS
with support from the Attorney General, SECDEF, and
SSAs. The new response plan should satisfy requirements of National Cybersecurity Act of 2014.113
In practice, the DoD still has some work to do with
its internal coordination of cyber incidents. In a report
published 3 months before PPD-41, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) noted, “[the] DoD’s guidance does not clearly define DSCA roles and responsibilities for domestic cyber incidents.”114 The official
DoD response concurred with the GAO findings and
agreed to update guidance to clarify the specific roles
and responsibilities as well as command relationships
necessary to provide DCSA support for significant
cyber incident response.115
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Information Sharing
In February 2013, two important documents were
released by the White House that included provisions
for enhanced information sharing to support national cyber security. The first was PPD-21, “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” which included “Enable Efficient Information Exchange by Identifying Baseline Data and Systems Requirements for
the Federal Government” as one of its three strategic
imperatives.116 This initiative expressed the value of
sharing threat and vulnerability information internally amongst federal agencies as well as externally with
private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure.117 The second document was Executive Order 13691, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity
Information Sharing,” focused on:
Policy. In order to address cyber threats to public health
and safety, national security, and economic security of
the United States, private companies, nonprofit organizations, executive departments and agencies (agencies),
and other entities must be able to share information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and collaborate
to respond in as close to real time as possible [emphasis
in original].118

Subsequent refinements to this information sharing
process include the February 2015 presidential direction to form the Cyber Threat Intel Integration Center
(CTIIC) to:
serve as the national cyber threat intelligence center to
‘connect the dots’ within government regarding malicious foreign cyber threats to the nation so that relevant
departments and agencies are aware of these threats in as
close to real time as possible.119
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Part of the CTIIC function will be to support “U.S. Cyber Command in its mission to defend the nation from
significant attacks in cyberspace.”120 To satisfy the requirements of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing
Act of 2015, a joint report authored by the DNI, DHS,
DoD, and DoJ in February 2016 summarized the current mechanisms for sharing cyber threat information
with both federal and non-federal entities. For the
DoD, the report included the contributions of the voluntary DIB Cybersecurity Program as well as those of
the DoD Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3).121 The report also highlighted the benefits of organizations such
as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
established in 1998 to “help critical infrastructure owners and operators protect their facilities, personnel and
customers from cyber and physical security threats
and other hazards.”122
Based on feedback from non-federal entities, the
DHS and DoJ published updated guidance on sharing
cyber threat indicators and defensive measures in June
2016.123 The preferred method of information sharing is
the DHS Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) program
that provides the capability that “enables the exchange
of cyber threat indicators between the Federal Government and the private sector at machine speed.”124
Public-Private Partnerships
An official White House blog article chronicling cybersecurity successes of 2015 and challenges for 2016
highlighted the desire of the administration to partner
with the private sector not only for information sharing, but also to achieve a national unity of effort for
cybersecurity:
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Companies, organizations, and government agencies
should be prepared to respond to and recover from incidents. . . . But just as we are dedicated to sharing appropriate information with the private sector to better defend
against cyber threats, we also stand ready to provide assistance to the private sector. . . . In 2016, we will refine
our policies and procedures to further strengthen our
unity of effort response, whether it is helping a Federal
agency or a private company.125

This concept of public-private partnerships is essential to both the cyber incident response and information sharing already discussed. The focus of the DoD’s
cyberspace-related efforts with the private sector is on
the DIB, but it may be called upon to support other
private sectors if directed.
An important organization for DoD cybersecurity activities with the DIB is the Damage Assessment
Management Office (DAMO) which “works in close
cooperation with the participating DIB companies to
review and assess cyber incidents on their networks
that involve DoD information.”126 Formed in 2008, the
DAMO tracks the review of potential information compromises in the DIB and works with the DC3 to conduct damage assessments. The DoD Chief Information
Officer manages the DIB Cyber Security/Information
Assurance Program to provide industry with threat
indicator databases and assistance.127 While this effort
is fixated on the large defense contractors, the DoD acknowledges the need to expand these programs to the
numerous small businesses within the DIB, as recommended in a September 2015 GAO report.128
The DoD’s work with the DIB also involves innovation ventures, such as the Defense Innovation Unit
Experimental (DIUx) initiative which may include
support of cyberspace portions of the Third Offset
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Strategy.129 Such efforts may be supported by existing
programs such as the Software and Supply Chain Assurance Forum and the National Cybersecurity Center
of Excellence.130 Science and technology projects may
be influenced by the 2016 Federal Cybersecurity Research
and Development Strategic Plan.131
International Efforts
Strategic Goal V of the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy
strives to build international alliances and partnerships
that involve significant coordination with the DoS. In
Table 6, Obama published an international cyberspace
strategy in 2011 that focused on achieving prosperity,
security, and openness. In March 2016, the DoS published their International Cyberspace Policy Strategy as
part of the reporting requirements from the cyberspace-related sections of the Consolidated Appropriation Act of 2016. Its stated purpose is to provide status
on the implementation of the President’s strategy and
to address three themes: international law, confidence
building measures, and norms of state behavior. The
strategy acknowledges the importance of “working in
partnership with other federal departments and agencies” toward accomplishing collective goals.132 Two areas of particular relevance to DoD cyber strategy are
deterrence and international norms. We now examine
how the DoS strategy addresses these topics.
Deterrence
The concept of achieving deterrence in cyberspace
was formalized in the 2011 international strategy with
the inclusion of a declaratory statement of U.S. willingness to respond to hostile acts in this new domain
as it would in the traditional domains (see excerpt in
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Table 6). The DoD Cyber Strategy carries forward the essence of the deterrence concepts from the President’s
international strategy, noting, the “DoD assumes that
the deterrence of cyberattacks on U.S. interests will not
be achieved through the articulation of cyber policies
alone, but through the totality of U.S. actions.”133 The
DoS strategy reflects the President’s December 2015
cyber deterrence policy that maintains the flexibility to
use multiple methods:
The United States works to counter threats in cyberspace
through a whole-of-government approach that brings to
bear its full range of instruments of national power and
corresponding policy tools―diplomatic, informational,
military, economic, intelligence, and law enforcement―as
appropriate and consistent with applicable law.134

The new deterrence policy envisions the use of a
combination of the methods of denial and cost imposition implemented using the various policy tools. Of
course, there is no cookbook solution; each application
of deterrence measures must be based on the merits of
the specific situation.135 Denial measures seek to reduce
the incentive for potential adversaries to attack cyberspace assets, in large part by “increasing the security
and resiliency of U.S. Government and private sector
computer systems.”136 If required, the approach of applying cost imposition measures may require more
direct action by DoD:
Military capabilities also provide an important set of options for deterring and responding to malicious cyber activity. As with all of the other tools described above, the
United States has made clear for some time that just because an attack takes place in cyberspace does not mean
a lawful and appropriate response must be conducted
through cyber means.137
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International Norms
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy acknowledges that
one of DoD’s important cyberspace activities is to “foster norms of responsible behavior to improve global
strategic stability.”138 The DoS strategy also strives to
achieve peace and stability:
While emphasizing that existing international law applies
to state behavior in cyberspace, the Department of State
has pioneered the promotion of a framework of shared
voluntary norms to guide state behavior in peacetime,
and advanced the development of practical cyber confidence building measures (CBMs) to reduce risk, with the
objective of establishing a coalition of states in support of
that framework.139

This concept of U.S. “cyber diplomacy” has three
key elements—international law, responsible state behavior, and CBMs. In implementing this concept, the
DoS plans to use bilateral and multilateral engagements to construct international consensus toward an
admirable end state:
The United States has developed and is promoting a strategic framework of international cyber stability, designed
to achieve and maintain a peaceful cyberspace environment where all states are able to fully realize its benefits,
where there are advantages to cooperating against common threats and avoiding conflict, and where there is little incentive for states to engage in disruptive behavior or
attack one another.140

Juxtaposed to this ideal worldview is the realization that military cyberspace capabilities are proliferating, and the dual-use nature of military technology
inherently is destabilizing.141 However, if military conflict in cyberspace does occur, it should still adhere to
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international norms, such as those expressed in vehicles such as the United Nations (UN) Charter, the Tallinn Manual, and the Laws of Armed Conflict.142 In fact,
the United States must realize that its military will be
establishing de facto norms by what it does in cyberspace.
Global Environment: Allies and Adversaries
Despite their concentration on the international aspects of cyberspace, neither the DoD nor DoS strategies
provide much detail on the population of cyberspace
users. A comparison of the population of Internet users by country in 2010 with those in 2015 reveals global
dynamics that should be considered in any cyberspace
strategy. Table 7 lists the countries with the top ten Internet user populations in 2015, the collective population of which comprises about 59 percent of the world’s
Internet users. The top five nations remained the same
from 2010 to 2015—China, India, United States, Brazil, and Japan―but the percent of growth in India was
over 300 percent. The combined Internet population of
China and India is over one billion users—more than
the total of the remaining top 10 countries. Nigeria and
Indonesia each more than doubled their number of Internet users and China, Brazil, and Russia each grew
more than 50 percent, while the United States, Japan,
Germany, and the United Kingdom each had moderate grow of less than 20 percent.
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Country

Millions of
Internet Users
in 2015 (Global
Ranking)

Millions of
Internet Users
in 2010 (Global
Ranking)

Percent Change

China

674 (1)

420 (1)

+ 60

India

354 (2)

81 (4)

+ 337

United States

281 (3)

240 (2)

+ 17

Brazil

118 (4)

76 (5)

+ 55

Japan

115 (5)

99 (3)

+ 16

Russia

103 (6)

60 (7)

+ 72

Nigeria

93 (7)

44 (10)

+ 111

Indonesia

73 (8)

30 (16)

+ 143

Germany

72 (9)

65 (6)

+ 11

United Kingdom

59 (10)

51 (8)

+ 16

Table 7. Populations of Internet Users
in 2010 and 2015.143
Friends and Allies. The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy
provides only general statements regarding how it will
build international partnerships. Priority of effort is
equally vague, with the strategy mentioning the importance of the Five Eyes treaty and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization alliance as well as the regions of the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Europe with no amplifying
details. From this, one could infer that the continents of
Africa and South America offer little value to U.S. mil-
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itary cyberspace operations. As may be expected, the
DoS International Cyberspace Policy Strategy provides
significantly more detail on U.S. diplomatic ventures
with other nations by citing specific accomplishments
and plans vice broad concepts of engagement.
The DoS strategy focuses on four of the prominent actors in cyberspace―China, Russia, Brazil, and
India—all of which also happen to be in the top six
countries in terms of Internet user populations. Interestingly, the DoS notes, “the Brazilian approach to
policy related to international security in cyberspace
is shaped by a number of factors, including its emerging cyber military capabilities and policies.”144 Brazil
is also a democratic nation with many national values
aligned with those of the United States including “its
willingness to affirm the applicability of international
law to state behavior in cyberspace.”145 For India, the
world’s largest democracy, the DoS strategy observes,
“the United States has a vibrant channel for engaging
India on international security and other cyber policy
issues, through the U.S.-India Cyber Dialogue.” The
framework of this bilateral endeavor echoes principles and concerns of the United States and designates
21 main areas of cooperation, including “developing
a common and shared understanding of international
cyber stability, and destabilizing cyber activity.”146
Potential Adversaries. The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy provides more specific information than the 2011
version, actually identifying four potential adversary
nations by name—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—as well as the nonstate actor of the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).147 However, only China receives further treatment in the strategy as a dedicated
implementation objective under Strategic Goal V. The
objective calls for the DoD to strengthen its cyber dia-
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logue with China “to reduce the risks of misperception
and miscalculation that could contribute to escalation
and instability.”148 The DoD strategy relegates Russia
to a mere endnote that may unwittingly worsen an already tenuous situation:
If and when U.S.-Russia military relations resume, as a
part of broader interagency efforts DoD will seek to develop a military-to-military cyber dialogue with Russia to
foster strategic stability in cyberspace.149

The Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy also dedicates more content to China than
any other country and asserts the following regarding
its view of international norms:
China has affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace, but has not been willing to affirm more specifically the applicability of the law of armed conflict or other
laws of war, because it believes it would only serve to
legitimize state use of cyber tools as weapons of war.150

Despite the diplomatic rhetoric, the 2015 U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review report to Congress concludes, “the Chinese government appears to believe
that it has more to gain than to lose from its cyber espionage and attack campaigns.”151 Contrary to the DoD
strategy’s view of Russia, the DoS strategy claims that
it has:
found common ground with the United States approach
of promoting the applicability of international law to state
conduct in cyberspace, as well as voluntary, non-binding
norms of state behavior in peacetime.152
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Perhaps to temper this remark, the DoS strategy goes
on to note that “Russia and China are the most assertive states advancing alternative visions for international stability in cyberspace and seeking to sway undecided states in regional and multilateral venues.”153
Summary
The 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy has excellent linkage
to presidential and congressional directives, policies,
and laws; this enhances its credibility with domestic
and international audiences. The federal budget appears to provide adequate funding to implement the
activities outlined in the strategy.
A spate of laws passed by Congress in 2014 and
2015 provided the foundation for much of the current
interagency work on cybersecurity. The DoD roles and
responsibilities to support this legislation focus on the
areas of cyber incident response, information sharing,
and public-private partnering. The DoD also has primary responsibility for helping to protect DIB critical infrastructure and may be called upon to perform
DCSA operations to help defend cyber-related infrastructure in other sectors. These activities are consistent with implementation objectives found in strategic
goals I and II.
Compared to the Department of State International
Cyberspace Policy Strategy, the DoD strategy is vague
regarding its international activities and priorities. Fortunately, both strategies address cyberspace-related
deterrence issues in a manner consistent with the latest
presidential policy. Unfortunately, neither strategy attempts to capture the changing nature of cyberspace
and how it may affect elements of national power.
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SUMMARY
This section summarizes the key findings from
the assessment of the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy accomplished utilizing five individual analytical frameworks.
It also identifies and integrates common themes that
may emerge from these different perspectives.
Strengths
Primacy of Civilian Authority
The DoD Cyber Strategy presents a firm and consistent portrayal of U.S. civilian control of military cyberspace operations through the President and SECDEF
as well as adherence to legislative direction and guidance for cybersecurity activities. It also expresses the
mandate of DoD activities in cyberspace to support enduring U.S. values of freedom, prosperity, and respect
for international law.
Deterrence
The DoD Cyber Strategy significantly expands the
discussion of cyberspace activities as they relate to
U.S. national deterrence policies over the mere mention of the topic in the previous strategy. The strategy includes the key elements of response, denial, and
resilience, coupled with the doctrine of constraint and
use of all elements of national power. This depiction of
deterrence is consistent not only with the President’s
2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, but also with
the updated tenets of U.S. cyber policy as described in
the DoS 2016 International Cyberspace Policy Strategy.
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Derivative Strategies
The DoD Cyber Strategy spawned a series of Service-specific supporting guidance and planning documents. The Army CIO/G-6, Army Cyber Command,
and Army Cyber Center of Excellence have strategic
planning publications in place that provide actionable
detail and some prioritization to the myriad tasks required to operationalize cyberspace for the soldier.
Collectively, these derivative strategies bring together
a diverse group of Army stakeholders and capabilities—cyber, signal, intelligence, and electronic warfare—to enable mission command in joint operations
that may cross many domains.
Areas of Concern
Lack of Clear End State
The DoD Cyber Strategy does not contain an explicit or implicit end state toward which to orient its five
strategic goals. The need for a clear vision to explain
the fundamental purpose of the strategy is essential,
given the public nature of its release and its anticipated
domestic and international readership.
No Prioritization of Efforts
The DoD Cyber Strategy lays out 30 implementation
objectives, several with multiple subtasks, and makes
mention of budget concerns that may affect progress
of these tasks. However, it offers no sense of priority
to guide the strategy implementation to apply limited
resources to boundless problems.
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Lack of Full Context
The DoD Cyber Strategy does have a section called
Strategic Context, but it serves mostly as a snapshot
of the current manifestation of cyberspace threats
and risks. It fails to provide any significant historical
information or provide any baseline definition of the
bounds of the cyberspace domain. Without such information, the strategy focuses on the present without
thoughtful consideration of the past or future.
Recommendations for Improvement
Future versions of The DoD Cyber Strategy or similar derivative strategies should consider incorporating the following recommendations to improve their
effectiveness:
• Provide a balanced and integrated hierarchy of
end state, goals, and implementing objectives as
well as explicit priorities for resources.
• Include a concise team line of past and future
milestones and key guidance documents to help
define the context of the current strategy.
• Provide specific examples of DoD responses to
cyberattack or other cyber-incidents with clear
ties to the strategy’s goals and objectives. The
example of the Sony hack in the 2015 strategy
was confusing since it did not mention any DoD
involvement in its resolution.
• Deliberately integrate and synchronize the actions, images, and words of the public released
strategy document to better support the DoD’s
strategic communication goals.
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In addition to these recommended structural changes,
future DoD cyber strategy should also incorporate the
following topics in its content:
• Address each Service and other major component’s unique focus and contribution to the
DoD cyberspace team.
• Include specific details on the organizations
and processes that provide support to combatant commanders.
• Discuss the dynamic context of U.S. Government guidance and policy refinement that may
be driven by events and decisions from executive, legislative, interagency, international, and
commercial fora.
• Address the fundamental characterizations that
define cyberspace domain and how they may
change in the future as well as the implications
of this change.
• Promote a dedicated effort to pursue cyberspace theory.
Closing Remarks
In evaluating the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy from a
holistic perspective, one must ask the simple question:
Can the strategy work? It appears to be suitable in the
sense that its individual goals all support DoD cyberspace operations as well as the greater needs of U.S.
national security. It appears to be feasible since external Federal Government authorities are providing the
funding and other resources necessary for its implementation. It appears to be acceptable since it has broad
support from the executive, legislative, and interagency organizations of the U.S. Government. However,
such positive assessments of suitability, feasibility, and
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acceptability may be predicated upon the vagueness of
the strategy’s overarching intent. Without a clear end
state, the strategy runs the risk of achieving objectives
that may diverge from each other, eventually weakening the ability to achieve integrated and synchronized
DoD cyberspace operations as well as activities of the
U.S. Government writ large.
To be fair, the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy is no worse
than many similar government documents and presents progress in many areas over its 2011 predecessor. However, this progress was firmly planted in safe
and comfortable themes that offered little in the way
of where DoD cyberspace operations have been and
where they are going. Worse, it implicitly treats cyberspace as a static domain that is well understood and
characterized by the DoD, when in fact it should be
considered a complex adaptive system that merits deliberate and significant study to define its fundamental nature. In the end, the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy is
a mild evolution of incremental efforts struggling to
characterize an operational domain that is growing in
size and complexity in ways that have yet to be understood.
ENDNOTES
1. Ashton Carter, “Drell Lecture: ‘Rewiring the Pentagon: Charting a New Path on Innovation and Cybersecurity’,”
Stanford, CA: Stanford University, available from defense.
gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=2575&Article=606666, accessed August 24, 2016.
2. The DoD Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, April, 2015, p. ii.
3. Ibid., p. ii.

62

4. Ibid. Examples of redundant material in the Implementing
Objectives include the task to assess Cyber Protection Team capabilities listed under different objectives on pp. 20 and 21, as well
as a repeated task to assess DFARS rules on p. 23.
5. “Fact Sheet: The Department of Defense (DoD) Cyber
Strategy, April 2015,” available from defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Department_of_Defense_Cyber_Strategy_Fact_Sheet.pdf, accessed October 23, 2015.
6. Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Unveils New DoD Cyber Strategy in Silicon Valley,” DoD News, April 23, 2015, available from
defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=1&ModuleId=753&Article=604511, accessed August 17, 2016.
7. Carter, “Drell Lecture.”
8. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. ii; and Carter, “Drell Lecture.”
Secretary Carter’s account of the Russian cyber intrusion follows:
So today, for example, I want to disclose a recent instance that
helps illustrate the cyber threat we face today and what to do
about it. It’s never been publically reported, and it shows
how rapidly DoD can detect, attribute, and expel an intruder
from our military networks―in this case, unclassified ones.
Earlier this year, the sensors that guard DoD’s unclassified
networks detected Russian hackers accessing one of our
networks. They’d discovered an old vulnerability in one of
our legacy networks that hadn’t been patched.
While it’s worrisome they achieved some unauthorized
access to our unclassified network, we quickly identified the
compromise, and had a team of incident responders hunting
down the intruders within 24 hours. After learning valuable
information about their tactics, we analyzed their network
activity, associated it with Russia, and then quickly kicked
them off the network, in a way that minimized their chances
of returning.

9. The DoD Cyber Strategy, available from defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Cyber-Strategy, accessed September 9, 2016. The
website has been online in this format since at least August 16,
2015, per a search of archived websites using the Internet Archive

63

Wayback Machine. The specific search result is available at web.
archive.org/web/20150816023321/http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0415_Cyber-Strategy, accessed August 25, 2016.
10. The DoD Cyber Strategy, pp. 3, 33. The only two mentions
of the previous DoD cyberspace strategy are:
The May 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating
in Cyberspace guided the Defense Department’s cyber
activities and operations in support of U.S. national interests
over the last four years. (p. 3)
Since developing its first cyber strategy in 2011, the Defense
Department has made significant progress in building its
cyber capabilities, developing its organizations and plans,
and fostering the partnerships necessary to defend the
country and its interests. More must be done. (p. 33)

11. Ibid. The word “doctrine” appears twice in the document
(see below), but not in an actionable sense that could be applied to
the tactical and operational implementation of the strategy.
To ensure that the Internet remains open, secure, and
prosperous, the United States will always conduct cyber
operations under a doctrine of restraint, as required to
protect human lives and to prevent the destruction of
property. (p. 6)
Through the course of this strategy, as part of the U.S.-China
Defense Consultative Talks and related dialogues, such
as the Cyber Working Group, DoD will continue to hold
discussions with China to bring greater understanding and
transparency of each nation’s military doctrine, policy, roles
and missions in cyberspace. (p. 28)

12. Thomas M. Chen, An Assessment of the Department of
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2013. The
evolution of cyberspace strategies is found on pp. 3-7, and a list
of key national security strategy documents and their sources is
included in the appendix (pp. 45-46).
13. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

64

14. DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, July 2011, p. i.
15. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. iii.
16. Ibid., p. 30. The following two bullets from Chen’s observations actually contain five different topics:
The strategy does not distinguish between different types of
adversaries—nation-states, foreign intelligence, hacktivists,
criminals, hackers, terrorists—nor does the strategy address
initiatives for specific types of adversaries.
The unclassified version of the strategy neglects to address
important issues: offense; attribution; rules for proper
response to cyber attacks; and metrics of progress toward
implementation. (p. 30)

17. The DoD Cyber Strategy. Specific discussion of types of
adversaries is included in the Introduction and Strategic Context
sections, as illustrated below:
State and non-state actors conduct cyber operations to
achieve a variety of political, economic, or military objectives.
In conducting their operations, they may strike at a nation’s
values as well as its interests or purposes. (p. 1)
Potential state and non-state adversaries conduct malicious
cyber activities against U.S. interests globally and in a manner
intended to test the limits of what the United States and the
international community will tolerate. Actors may penetrate
U.S. networks and systems for a variety of reasons, such
as to steal intellectual property, disrupt an organization’s
operations for activist purposes, or to conduct disruptive
and destructive attacks to achieve military objectives. (p. 9)
In addition to state-based threats, non-state actors like the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) use cyberspace
to recruit fighters and disseminate propaganda and have
declared their intent to acquire disruptive and destructive
cyber capabilities. Criminal actors pose a considerable
threat in cyberspace, particularly to financial institutions,
and ideological groups often use hackers to further their
political objectives. State and non-state threats often also
blend together; patriotic entities often act as cyber surrogates

65

for states, and non-state entities can provide cover for statebased operators. This behavior can make attribution more
difficult and increases the chance of miscalculation. (p. 9)

18. Ibid., p. 29.
19. Ibid., pp. 11-12. The strategy included these details
regarding the envisioned teamwork to achieve attribution of
cyberattacks:
Attribution is a fundamental part of an effective cyber
deterrence strategy as anonymity enables malicious
cyber activity by state and non-state groups. On matters
of intelligence, attribution, and warning, DoD and the
intelligence community have invested significantly in all
source collection, analysis, and dissemination capabilities,
all of which reduce the anonymity of state and non-state
actor activity in cyberspace. Intelligence and attribution
capabilities help to unmask an actor’s cyber persona,
identify the attack’s point of origin, and determine tactics,
techniques, and procedures. Attribution enables the Defense
Department or other agencies to conduct response and
denial operations against an incoming cyberattack.
Public and private attribution can play a significant role in
dissuading cyber actors from conducting attacks in the first
place. The Defense Department will continue to collaborate
closely with the private sector and other agencies of the
U.S. Government to strengthen attribution. This work will
be especially important for deterrence as activist groups,
criminal organizations, and other actors acquire advanced
cyber capabilities over time. (pp. 11-12)

20. Ibid., p. 19.
21. Chen, p. 30.
22. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 26.
23. Ibid., p. 6.
24. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, Washington,
DC: The White House, February 2015, pp. 12-13.

66

25. Department of Defense (DoD), Quadrennial Defense Review
2014, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March
4, 2014, pp. X, 33.
26. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. iii.
27. Obama, National Security Strategy; Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.
28. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2015: The United States Military’s
Contribution To National Security, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of
Staff, June 2015, pp. 2, 11. The 12 Joint Force Prioritized Missions
are:
1. Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent
2. Provide for military defense of the homeland
3. Defeat an adversary
4. Provide a global, stabilizing presence
5. Combat terrorism
6. Counter weapons of mass destruction
7. Deny an adversary’s objectives
8. Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency
operations
9. Conduct military engagement and security cooperation
10. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations
11. Provide support to civil authorities
12. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response
(p. 11)

29. Chuck Hagel, “The Defense Innovation Initiative,” memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense et al., Washington,
DC: Secretary of Defense, November 15, 2014. Secretary Hagel
describes the context of the Third Offset Strategy as:
History is instructive on this 21st Century challenge. The
U.S. changes the security landscape of the 1970s and 1980s
with networked precision strike, stealth, and surveillance for
conventional forces. We will identify a third offset strategy
that puts the competitive advantage firmly in the hands of
American power projection over the coming decades. (p. 2)

30. Carter, “Drell Lecture.” Secretary Carter describes the historical context of the second offset strategy as:

67

Let me step back. During the Cold War, Bill Perry drove a so
called “offset strategy” that harnessed American technology
to radically change warfare through precision guided
munitions, network centric forces, and stealth aircraft. It
came to life during the 1991 Gulf War – when the world
watched, stunned, at what the American military might had
achieved. But the world has since had a quarter century to
figure out how to counter these capabilities.

31. Bob Work, “The Third Offset Strategy and Its Implications
for Partners and Allies,” speech presented at the Willard Hotel,
Washington, DC, January 28, 2015, available from defense.gov/
News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies, accessed August 27,
2016. Deputy Secretary of Defense Work describes how the DoD
is continuing to pursue the initiative started by SECDEF Hagel:
So to maintain our warfighting edge, we’re trying to
address this erosion our perceived erosion of technological
superiority with the Defense Innovation Initiative and
the Third Offset Strategy. Now, as Secretary Hagel said,
this new initiative is an ambitious department-wide effort
to identify and invest in innovative ways to sustain and
advance America’s military dominance for the 21st century.
Now, we make significant investments in our nuclear
enterprise; new space capabilities; advanced sensors,
communications and munitions for power projection
in contested environments; missile defense; and cyber
capabilities.

32. H. Richard Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art
Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model,” in J.
Boone Bartholomees, Jr., ed., The U.S. Army War College Guide to
National Security Issues, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy, 4th
Ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, July 2010, ch. 3, p. 45.
33. Ibid., pp. 45-48.
34. “Internet Users,” available from internetlivestats.com/internet-users/, accessed August 29, 2016. This website lists the number
of Internet users in 2011 as 2,231,957,359 and in 2015 as 3,185,
996,155. It defines an Internet user as an “individual who can

68

access the Internet at home, via any device type and connection.”
Of course, many Internet users connect through a multitude of
devices—computers, mobile telephones, television, automobiles,
etc.—and thus may have multiple persona on the Internet. During
this same timeframe, the website reports that the number of websites increased from 346,004,403 to 863,105,652. It defines a website as a “unique hostname” (a name which can be resolved, using
a name server, into an IP address).
35. Yarger, p. 49.
36. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 1.
37. Ibid., p. 1.
38. Ibid., p. 7. Strategic Goal IV includes:
To facilitate this work, the Joint Staff will work with
USSTRATCOM to synchronize and integrate requirements
into planning and provide recommendations to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the alignment,
allocation, assignment, and apportionment of Cyber Mission
Forces. (p. 26)

39. U.S. Joint Staff Joint Force Development (J-7), Cross-Domain Synergy in Joint Operations: Planner’s Guide, Washington, DC:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 14, 2016, available from www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/cross_domain_planning_guide.
pdf, accessed August 2016.
40. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 11.
41. Ibid., p. 6.
42. Ibid. The strategy describes the different CMF teams as
follows:
The Cyber Mission Force will be comprised of cyber operators
organized into 133 teams, primarily aligned as follows:
Cyber Protection Forces will augment traditional defensive
measures and defend priority DoD networks and systems
against priority threats; National Mission Forces and their
associated support teams will defend the United States and
its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence;

69

and Combat Mission Forces and their associated support
teams will support combatant commands by generating
integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans
and contingency operations. Combatant commands integrate
Combat Mission Forces and Cyber Protection Teams into
plans and operations and employ them in cyberspace, while
the National Mission Force operates under the Commander
of USCYBERCOM. Outside of this construct, teams can
also be used to support other missions as required by the
Department. (p. 6)

43. G. Alexander Crowther and Shaheen Ghori, “Detangling
the Web: A Screenshot of U.S. Government Cyber Activity,” Joint
Force Quarterly, No. 78, 3rd Quarter 2015, pp. 75-83. The article
lists the four Joint Forces Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C) as:
•
•
•
•

JFHQ-C Washington supports U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern
Command.
JFHQ-C Georgia supports U.S. Central Command, U.S.
Africa Command, and U.S. Northern Command.
JFHQ-C Texas supports U.S. European Command,
USSTRATCOM, and U.S. Transportation Command.
JFHQ-DoDIN defends DoD information networks at
USCYBERCOM. (p. 81)

44. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 20.
45. Ibid., p. 29. The Principal Cyber Advisor was created in
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2014.
46. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 4. Other significant mentions of
the role of the President in DoD cyberspace operations include:
While cyberattacks are assessed on a case-by-case and fact
specific basis by the President and the U.S. national security
team, significant consequences may include loss of life,
significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign
policy consequences, or serious economic impact on the
United States. . . . If directed by the President or the Secretary
of Defense, the U.S. military may conduct cyber operations
to counter an imminent or on-going attack against the U.S.
homeland or U.S. interests in cyberspace. . . . There may be
times when the President or the Secretary of Defense may
determine that it would be appropriate for the U.S. military
to conduct cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s

70

military related networks or infrastructure so that the U.S.
military can protect U.S. interests in an area of operations.
(p. 5)
The United States has articulated this declaratory policy in
the 2011 United States International Strategy for Cyberspace,
in the Department of Defense Cyberspace Policy Report to
Congress of 2011, and through public statements by the
President and the Secretary of Defense. (p. 11)

47. Ibid., pp. 5, 11.
48. Ibid., p. 30.
49. Ibid., pp. 1-12.
50. Ibid., p. 2.
51. Ibid., p. 9. The strategy states “China steals intellectual
property (IP) from global businesses to benefit Chinese companies and undercut U.S. competitiveness.” However, it does not
provide any costs related to this theft.
52. Ibid., p. 7.
53. Michael S. Rogers, “Beyond the Build, Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace: The Commander’s Vision and Guidance for US Cyber Command,” Fort Meade, MD: U.S. Cyber
Command, June 3, 2015.
54. Ibid., back cover.
55. Despite the vague nature of the USCYBERCOM vision
document, component commands have attempted to support
its major themes. See “Beyond the Build: How the Component
Commands Support the U.S. Cyber Command Vision,” Joint Force
Quarterly, No. 80, 1st Quarter 2016, pp. 86-93.
56. Figure adapted from Rogers, “Beyond the Build, Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace,” p. 11, back cover.
57. Michael S. Rogers, “Statement of Admiral Michael S.
Rogers, Commander, United States Cyber Command before the

71

Senate Armed Service Committee, 5 April 2016,” Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
58. Ibid., pp. 3, 5.
59. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
60. DoD Cybersecurity Discipline Implementation Plan, Washington, DC: DoD, October 2015, Amended February 2016, p. 4,
available from dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Cyber/CyberDis-ImpPlan.pdf, accessed August 23, 2016. The plan is organized
along four Lines of Effort:
1. Strong authentication―to degrade the adversaries’ ability
to maneuver on DoD information networks;
2. Device hardening―to reduce internal and external attack
vectors into DoD information networks;
3. Reduce attack surface―to reduce external attack vectors
into DoD information networks; and,
4. Alignment to cybersecurity/computer network defense
service providers―to improve detection of and response to
adversary activity. (p. 3)

61. Ibid., pp. 23-26.
62. Martin E. Dempsey and Ash Carter, “Department of
Defense Cybersecurity Culture and Compliance Initiative,” Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 30, 2015,
available from defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/OSD01151715-RES-Final.pdf, accessed August 29, 2016.
63. Ibid., pp. 2-5.
64. Rogers, p. 1.
65. DoD, Cyberspace Workforce Strategy, Washington, DC:
DoD, December 4, 2013, p. 3, available from dodcio.defense.gov/
Portals/0/Documents/DoD%20Cyberspace%20Workforce%20Strategy_signed(final).pdf, accessed August 31, 2015. This strategy preceded the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy and addresses the entire DoD

72

cyberspace workforce, not just the cyber mission force. Much of
the policy and responsibilities related to this strategy have been
codified in DoD Directive 8140.01, Cyberspace Workforce Management, Washington, DC: DoD Chief Information Officer, August
11, 2015.
66. Defense Information Systems Agency Strategic Plan 20152020, Fort Meade, MD: Defense Information Systems Agency,
June 10, 2015, available from www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/
About/Strategic-Plan.pdf, accessed August 23, 2016.
67. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Army Network Campaign
Plan: 2020 & Beyond, Washington, DC: Office of the Army Chief
Information Officer/G-6, February 2016, pp. 7-8, available from
ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/Architecture/ANCP%20PRINT%206%20
FEB%2015.pdf, accessed August 31, 2016. The plan has five lines
of effort:
[1] Provide Signal Capabilities to the Force
[2] Enhance Cybersecurity Capabilities
[3] Increase Network Throughput and Ensure Sufficient
Computing Infrastructure
[4] Deliver IT Services to the Edge
[5] Strengthen Network Operations (pp. 12-18).

68. Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Concept for Cyberspace Operations, Version 2.0, Quantico, VA: Headquarters U.S.
Marine Corps, October 9, 2015, p. iii, available from marinecorpsconceptsandprograms.com/sites/default/files/concepts/pdf-uploads/
MCFC%206-1%20Cyberspace%20Operations_1.pdf,
accessed
August 31, 2016.
69. U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/TENTH Fleet Strategic Plan 20152020, Fort Meade, MD: U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet,
May 2015, available from www.navy.mil/strategic/FCC-C10F%20
Strategic%20Plan%202015-2020.pdf, accessed August 4, 2015. The
Executive Summary includes “we lay out five pivotal, strategic
goals that we will achieve in the next five years. For each of those
five-year goals, we also cite specific, verifiable outcomes that

73

must be achieved in the next 18 months to ensure that we are on
course.” (p. 2) These five strategic goals are:
[1] Operate the Network as a Warfighting Platform (p. 10)
[2] Conduct Tailored Signals Intelligence (p. 14)
[3] Deliver Warfighting Effects Through Cyberspace (p. 16)
[4] Create Shared Cyber Situational Awareness (p. 18)
[5] Establish and Mature Navy’s Cyber Mission Force (p. 20)

70. U.S. Air Force Chief Information Officer (CIO)/A6 Chief,
Information Dominance, Air Force Information Dominance Flight Plan:
The Way Forward for Cyberspace IT in the United States Air Force,
Washington, DC: Secretary of the Air Force, May 1, 2015, available from www.safcioa6.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-150610015.PDF, accessed August 31, 2016. This USAF plan focuses on
four strategic goals:
1. Provide Airmen trusted information where they need it so
they can be most effective. (p. 18)
2. Organize, train, equip, and educate Cyber-Airmen to be
experts in cyberspace and the Air Force core missions to
which they contribute. (p. 18)
3. Deliver freedom of action in and through cyberspace to
advance Air Force core missions. (p. 19)
4. Optimize the planning, programming, budgeting and
execution of cyberspace investments. (p. 19)

71. U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S.
Coast Guard, June 2015, pp. 9-10, available from uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/cyber.pdf, accessed August 4, 2016. The USCG
strategy includes supporting goals for each of its three strategic
priorities:
Strategic Priority: Defending Cyberspace:
Goal 1. Identify and Harden Systems and Networks (p. 23)
Goal 2. Understand and Counter Cyber Threats (p. 24)

74

Goal 3. Increase Operational Resilience (p. 25)
Strategic Priority: Enabling Operations:
Goal 1: Incorporate Cyberspace Operations into Mission
Planning and Execution (p. 27)
Goal 2: Deliver Cyber Capabilities to Enhance All Missions
(p. 28)
Strategic Priority: Protecting Infrastructure
Goal 1. Risk Assessment—Promote Cyber Risk Awareness
and Management (p. 32)
Goal 2. Prevention—Reduce Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
in the MTS (p. 33)

72. Robert Ferrell, “Network Readiness in a Complex World,”
presentation at the 15th Annual Army IT Day, Vienna, VA, Armed
Forces Communications and Electronics Association, March 31,
2016. As part of his unclassified presentation, LTG Ferrell, Army
Chief Information Officer/G6, provided an overview of the hierarchy and linkage of documents that form the Army network
strategy.
73. Robert Ferrell, “The Army and the New DoD Cyber Strategy,” leader blog available from ciog6.army.mil/AboutCIO/LeaderBlog/tabid/108/EntryId/61/TheArmyandtheNewDoDCyberStrategy.
aspx, accessed August 4, 2016.
74. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Army Network Campaign Plan:
Implementation Guidance Near Term 2016-17, Washington, DC:
Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6, February 2016,
available from ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/ANCP/ANCP%20Nearterm%20impl%20plan%2016-17.pdf, accessed September 1, 2016.
75. Headquarters, U.S. Army, Army Network Campaign Plan:
Implementation Guidance Mid Term 2018-22, Washington, DC:
Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6, February
2016, available from ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/Home/Tabs/Strategy/
ANCP%20Mid-term%20Impl%20Plan%2018-22.pdf, accessed September 1, 2016.

75

76. Shaping the Army Network: 2025-2040, Washington, DC:
Office of the Army Chief Information Office/G-6, March 2016,
available from peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/docs/Shaping_the_Army_Network_2025-2040.pdf, accessed April 5, 2016.
77. Ibid., pp. 32-34. For more details in the mission command
network, see The Mission Command Network: Vision & Narrative,
Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, October 1, 2015,
available from usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/mccoe/
MissionCommandNetworkNarrative1Oct15.pdf, accessed September
1, 2016. This documents define mission command network as:
The “Mission Command Network (MC Network)” is
integrated mission command and LandWarNet capabilities,
which enable commanders, leaders & soldiers to exercise
mission command (the philosophy) and integrate all
warfighting functions and Unified Action enablers (the
warfighting function). It is an inherent component of
the Joint Information Environment. The MC Network
allows commanders to develop and maintain situational
understanding, maneuver across domains and locations,
and conduct joint combined arms operations to accomplish
the mission. (p. 3)

78. Army Cloud Computing Strategy, Version 1.1, Washington, DC: Office of the Army Chief Information Office/G-6, March
2015, available from ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/AboutCIO/Mission/
Strategy/20150424_Army_Cloud_Computing_Strategy.pdf, accessed
August 31, 2016. The document’s Executive Summary states its
purpose:
The Army Cloud Computing Strategy establishes and
communicates the Army’s vision and strategy for delivering
cloud-enabled network capabilities to improve mission and
business effectiveness, increase operational information
technology (IT) efficiencies and protect Army data and
infrastructure. The Army Cloud Computing Strategy extends
the baseline and concepts defined in the various federal,
DoD, and Army policies and documents and is nested with
the Army Network Campaign Plan. (p. 1)

79. Army Data Strategy, Version 1.0, Washington, DC:
Office of the Army Chief Information Office/G-6, February
2016, available from ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/AboutCIO/Mission/

76

Strategy/20160303_Army_Data_Strategy_2016.pdf, accessed August
31, 2016. The document’s Executive Summary states its purpose:
The Army Data Strategy describes the Army’s vision and
goals for establishing a solid foundation for sharing data,
information and IT services across the Army – extending
into the Joint Information Environment. The Army Data
Strategy builds upon the Department of Defense (DoD)
Net-Centric Data Strategy baseline of making data visible,
accessible, understandable, trusted and interoperable. As
part of these efforts, the Chief Information Officer/G-6
has partnered with the Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) to implement the
Common Operating Environment. (p. 7)

80. U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence Strategic Plan, Fort
Gordon, GA: U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence, September
2015, available from cybercoe.army.mil/images/CyberCoE%20Documents/strategic_plan_2015_revision4_9_14_2015.pdf, accessed October 22, 2015. The purpose of scope of this plan includes:
This strategy defines the Cyber CoE vision, mission, lines
of effort, strategic imperatives, and objectives required to
integrate capabilities across the Army to include the Army’s
signal, electronic warfare (EW), and military intelligence
(MI) partners (see Figure 1) together with other Joint
Service and Intelligence capabilities. The Cyber CoE with
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) and the Army Cyber
Institute (ACI) form the nucleus of “Team Cyber” for the
Army while leveraging the Intelligence Center of Excellence
(ICoE), the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM), the Network Enterprise Command (NETCOM),
along with the greater Signal and Intelligence Communities
to achieve dominance in the cyberspace domain. Cyber CoE
activities must be coordinated and complementary with/to
ARCYBER and ACI. The Cyber COE Strategy spans from
the present through FY [fiscal year] 2025 to meet emerging
Joint, Interagency, and Multi-national (JIM) operational
environment challenges. (p. 3)

81. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 3.

77

82. “Foreign Policy Cybersecurity,” White House official
website, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
node/233081, accessed August 30, 2017.
83. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. iii.
84. “Foreign Policy Cybersecurity” White House official website. The priority numbers listed in Table 6 reflect the same order
of presentation on the White House website.
85. Shaun Donovan, Beth F. Colbert, and Tony Scott, Executive Office of the President, “Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Strategy,” M-16-15, Memorandum for Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, July 12, 2016, p. 10, available from obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-15.
pdf, accessed September 1, 2016.
86. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13718 of February 9, 2016,
“Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity,” Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 29, February 12, 2016, p. 7441, available from
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-02-12/pdf/2016-03038.pdf, accessed September 1, 2016.
87. Shaun Donovan and Tony Scott, “Cyber Strategy and
Implementation Plan (CSIP) for the Federal Civilian Government,” N-16-04, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Washington, DC: Office of Management
and Budget, October 30, 2015, available from https://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=788143, accessed August 30, 2017.
88. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13691 of February 12,
2015, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Federal Register, Vol. 80, No. 34, February 20, 2015, p. 9349,
available from gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-02-20/pdf/2015-03714.pdf,
accessed September 1, 2016.
89. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13636 of February 12,
2013, “Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” Federal
Register, Vol. 78, No. 33, February 19, 2013, pp. 117399-11740,
available from gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03915.pdf,
accessed September 1, 2016.

78

90. Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive―United
States Cyber Incident Coordination,” PPD-41, Washington, DC:
The White House, July 26, 2016, available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident, accessed August 30, 2017.
91. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13694 of April 2, 2015,
“Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities,” Federal Register, Vol.
80, No. 63, April 2, 2015, pp. 18077, available from gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/FR-2015-04-02/pdf/2015-07788.pdf, accessed September 1, 2016.
92. Barack Obama, Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015,
“Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect To North Korea,”
Federal Register, Vol. 80, No. 3, January 6, 2015, pp. 819, available
from gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-06/pdf/2015-00058.pdf, accessed
September 1, 2016.
93. Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Washington,
DC: The White House, May 2011, p. 14.
94. Rita Tehan, “Cybersecurity: Legislation, Hearings, and
Executive Branch Documents,” Congressional Research Service
(CRS) Report R43317, Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, July 8, 2016, p. i.
95. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
96. “Fact Sheet: Cybersecurity National Action Plan,” Washington, DC: The White House, February 9, 2016, available from
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/
fact-sheet-cybersecurity-national-action-plan, accessed August 30,
2017. The four major parts of the CNAP are:
•
•

•

Establish the “Commission on Enhancing National
Cybersecurity.
Modernize government IT and transform how the
Government manages cybersecurity through the
proposal of a $3.1 billion Information Technology
Modernization Fund.
Empower Americans to secure their online accounts
by moving beyond just passwords and adding an extra
layer of security.

79

•

Invest over $19 billion for cybersecurity as part of the
President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 Budget.

97. Ibid.
98. 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 10.
99. “Fact Sheet: Highlights of National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016,” Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, September 29, 2015, pp. 6-7, available from rules.house.
gov/sites/republicans.rules.house.gov/files/114/PDF/114-CRHR1735SxS.pdf, accessed August 29, 2016. The NDAA included significant efforts to improve DoD cyberspace operations:
The Conferees agreed to a number of provisions to create,
expand or clarify authorities to support the Department’s
ability to man, train and equip cyber forces, and operate
cyber forces at the speeds necessary to function in the cyber
domain. These include:
Creation of a new cyber personnel hiring authority for U.S.
Cyber Command and the cyber commands of the military
department;
Limited cyber acquisition authority for U.S. Cyber
Command;
Codification of cyber liability protections for certain covered
contractors;
Designation of an entity responsible for the acquisition of
certain critical cyber capabilities;
An assessment of the capabilities of Cyber Command to
defend the U.S. from cyber-attacks;
A plan for biennial exercises for responding to cyber-attacks;
and,
Evaluation and remediation of cyber vulnerabilities of major
weapons systems. (p. 7)

100. “Consolidated DoD FY17 Budget Fact Sheet,” DoD website, available from defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2016/0216_budget/

80

docs/2-4-16_Consolidated_DoD_FY17_Budget_Fact_Sheet.pdf,
accessed August 23, 2016.
Addressing Cyber Threats. In response to increased threats,
we will spend $6.7 billion strengthening cyber defenses and
increasing options available in case of a cyber-attack. The
Budget:
Executes The DoD Cyber Strategy to defend DoD networks
and systems, defend the United States and its interests
against cyber-attacks of significant consequence, and provide
integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations.
Supports the Cyber Mission Force, continuing to provide
personnel to create 133 fully operational teams by the end
of FY 2018, investing in innovative approaches to provide
a virtual environment for cyber personnel to train, and
equipping the force with necessary tools and platforms.
Develops offensive cyber capabilities to support military
operations and provide response and deterrence options to
leadership. (p. 5)

101. Ibid., p. 5.
102. Jeffrey Caton, Distinguishing Acts of War in Cyberspace:
Assessment Criteria, Policy Considerations, and Response Implications,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
September 2013, pp. 52-53.
103. Obama, PPD-41.
104. Ibid., para. II of this document contains the following
definitions:
A. Cyber incident. An event occurring on or conducted
through a computer network that actually or imminently
jeopardizes the integrity, confidentiality, or availability
of computers, information or communications systems or
networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by
computers or information systems, or information resident
thereon. For purposes of this directive, a cyber incident may
include a vulnerability in an information system, system
security procedures, internal controls, or implementation
that could be exploited by a threat source.

81

B. Significant cyber incident. A cyber incident that is (or
group of related cyber incidents that together are) likely
to result in demonstrable harm to the national security
interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United States
or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health
and safety of the American people.

105. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 5. Significant cyberattacks are
decribed as:
While cyberattacks are assessed on a case-by-case and fact
specific basis by the President and the U.S. national security
team, significant consequences may include loss of life,
significant damage to property, serious adverse U.S. foreign
policy consequences, or serious economic impact on the
United States. (p. 5)

106. Obama, PPD-41.
107. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM)
6510.01B, Cyber Incident Handling Program, Washington, DC: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, July 10, 2012.
108. Ibid., pp. A-5 and F-6.
109. Ibid., p. B-A-4.
110. “Annex for Presidential Policy Directive―United States
Cyber Incident Coordination,” Washington, DC: The White
House, July 26, 2016, available from obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2016/07/26/annex-presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident, accessed September 2, 2016.
111. PPD-41 Annex.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. “DoD Needs to Clarify Its Roles and Responsibilities
for Defense Support of Civil Authorities during Cyber Incidents,” Report GAO-16-332, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Accountability Office, April 2016, p. 12, available from gao.gov/
assets/680/676322.pdf, accessed September 6, 2016.

82

115. Ibid., p. 26.
116. Barack Obama, “Presidential Policy Directive―Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” PPD-21, Washington,
DC: The White House, February 12, 2013, available from https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil, accessed
August 30, 2017.
117. Ibid. PPD-21 describes information sharing as follows:
A secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure
requires the efficient exchange of information, including
intelligence, between all levels of governments and critical
infrastructure owners and operators. This must facilitate
the timely exchange of threat and vulnerability information
as well as information that allows for the development of
a situational awareness capability during incidents. The
goal is to enable efficient information exchange through
the identification of requirements for data and information
formats and accessibility, system interoperability, and
redundant systems and alternate capabilities should there
be a disruption in the primary systems.
Greater information sharing within the government and with
the private sector can and must be done while respecting
privacy and civil liberties. Federal departments and agencies
shall ensure that all existing privacy principles, policies, and
procedures are implemented consistent with applicable
law and policy and shall include senior agency officials for
privacy in their efforts to govern and oversee information
sharing properly.

118. Obama, Executive Order 13691 of February 12, 2015.
119. “Fact Sheet: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration
Center,” Washington, DC: The White House, February 25, 2015,
available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/25/fact-sheet-cyber-threat-intelligence-integration-center,
accessed September 6, 2016. The CTIIC relationship to existing
cybersecurity information fusion centers is described as:
The CTIIC will not be an operational center. It will not
collect intelligence manage incident response efforts, direct

83

investigations, or replace other functions currently performed
by existing departments, agencies, or government cyber
centers. Instead, the CTIIC will support the NCCIC in its
network defense and incident response mission; the NCIJTF
in its mission to coordinate, integrate, and share information
related to domestic cyber threat investigations; and U.S.
Cyber Command in its mission to defend the nation from
significant attacks in cyberspace. The CTIIC will provide
these entities, as well as other departments and agencies,
with intelligence needed to carry out their cybersecurity
missions.

120. Ibid.
121. “Sharing of Cyber Threat Indicators and Defensive
Measures by the Federal Government under the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015,” Washington, DC: The Office
of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Departments of
Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice, February 16, 2016,
available from us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/Federal_Government_Sharing_Guidance_(103).pdf, accessed August 5, 2016.
122. “About ISACs,” National Council of ISACs official website, available from isaccouncil.org/, accessed September 6, 2016.
The website describes the original of ISACs as:
The concept of ISACs was introduced and promulgated
pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63),
signed May 22, 1998, after which the federal government
asked each critical infrastructure sector to establish sectorspecific organizations to share information about threats and
vulnerabilities. Some ISACs formed as early as 1999, and
most have been in existence for at least ten years.

123. “Guidance to Assist Non-Federal Entities to Share Cyber
Threat Indicators and Defensive Measures with Federal Entities under the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015,”
Washington, DC: DHS and DoJ, available from us-cert.gov/sites/
default/files/ais_files/Non-Federal_Entity_Sharing_Guidance_(Sec%20
105(a)).pdf, accessed August 5, 2016.
124. “Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS),” factsheet,
Washington, DC: DHS, available from us-cert.gov/ais, accessed
August 5, 2016.

84

125. Lisa O. Monaco, “Administration Efforts on Cybersecurity: The Year in Review and looking Forward to 2016,”
Washington, DC: The White House, February 2, 2016, available
from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/02/02/administration-efforts-cybersecurity-year-review-and-looking-forward-2016,
accessed August 30, 2017.
126. “RD: TSO: DAMO,” Technology Security Office official
website, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
& Engineering, available from acq.osd.mil/rd/tech_security/damo/,
accessed August 19, 2016.
127. “Opportunities Exist for DoD to Share Cybersecurity
Resources with Small Businesses,” Report GAO-15-777, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2015,
p. 22, available from gao.gov/assets/680/672724.pdf, accessed September 7, 2016. The DIB Cyber Security/Information Assurance
Program:
Provides members with more than 117,000 unclassified
threat indicators, including technical signatures that identify
potentially malicious actors. Defense Industrial Base Cyber
Security/Information Assurance also includes a classified
explanation for each threat indicator. Additionally, Defense
Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance
members receive regular updates on new threats, and receive
additional assistance as needed from DoD Chief Information
Officer based on information collected by DoD. Defense
Industrial Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance also
provides an environment for threat information sharing
among members through regular threat information updates
and actions as needed from the DoD Chief Information
Officer based on information provided by Defense Industrial
Base Cyber Security/Information Assurance members.

128. Ibid., pp. 13, 25. The report’s conclusions include:
While DoD OSBP [Office of Small Business Programs]
officials have recognized the importance of educating
defense small businesses about cybersecurity, they have
not identified and disseminated cybersecurity resources
through their outreach and education efforts to businesses
because they have been focused on other priorities, such
as developing a training curriculum for DoD professionals

85

who work with small businesses. By identifying and
disseminating information about existing cybersecurity
resources to defense small businesses, these businesses may
be made more aware of cybersecurity practices and cyber
threats, thereby potentially assisting them in protecting their
networks against cyber exploits. (p. 13)

129. “Defense Innovation Unit Experimental,” official website, available from diux.mil, accessed September 8, 2016. The website lists the DIUx mission as:
The U.S. Department of Defense relies on innovation to
maintain our nation’s ability to deter, and if need be, prevail
in conflict.
With outposts in the heart of Silicon Valley and Boston,
Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) serves as a
bridge between those in the U.S. military executing on some
of our nation’s toughest security challenges and companies
operating at the cutting edge of technology.
As our name implies, DIUx is just that: an “experiment.” We
continuously iterate on how best to identify, contract, and
prototype novel innovations through sources traditionally
not available to the Department of Defense, with the ultimate
goal of accelerating technology into the hands of the men
and women in uniform.

130. “Fact Sheet: Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015,”
Washington, DC: The White House, July 9, 2015, available from
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/09/
fact-sheet-administration-cybersecurity-efforts-2015, accessed August
30, 2017.
131. Monaco, “Administration Efforts on Cybersecurity.”
132. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
Public Law 114-113, Division N, Title IV, Section 402, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, March 2016, p. 1.
133. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 10. The three key parts of
deterrence are listed as response, denial, and resilience. (p. 11)

86

134. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
p. 20.
135. Ibid., p. 20. Deterrence by denial and cost imposition are
described as:
The United States believes deterrence in cyberspace is best
accomplished through a combination of “deterrence by
denial”—reducing the incentive of potential adversaries to
use cyber capabilities against the United States by persuading
them that the United States can deny their objectives – and
“deterrence through cost imposition” – threatening or
carrying out actions to inflict penalties and costs against
adversaries that conduct malicious cyber activity against the
United States. It is important to note there is no one-sizefits-all approach to deterring or responding to cyber threats.
Rather, the individual characteristics of a particular threat
determine the tools that would most appropriately be used.
(p. 20)

136. Ibid., p. 20. Methods of achieving deterrence by denial
include:
The President has at his disposal a number of tools to
carry out deterrence by denial. These include a range of
policies, regulations, and voluntary standards aimed at
increasing the security and resiliency of U.S. Government
and private sector computer systems. They also include
incident response capabilities and certain law enforcement
authorities, such as those used by the Department of Justice
to take down criminal botnets. They include cyber threat
information sharing mechanisms, as well as public-private
partnerships. International cooperation is also a key element
of the United States’ strategy to respond to and prevent
cyber incidents. The Department of Homeland Security’s
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC) and law enforcement agencies frequently
engage foreign counterparts to share information and
coordinate operational assistance in responding to and
mitigating malicious activities taking place from abroad. The
Department of State can use its diplomatic channels, where
appropriate, to bring a whole-of-government response to
particular cyber incidents, and promote cooperation among
policy makers in addressing these incidents. (pp. 20-21)

87

137. Ibid., p. 22. The DoS strategy includes an excellent and
concise summary of the DoD cyber missions and force:
The Department of Defense continues to build its cyber
capabilities and strengthen its cyber defense and deterrence
posture. As part of this effort, the Department of Defense
is building its Cyber Mission Force of 133 teams to be
fully operational by the end of 2018. The Cyber Mission
Force, which already is employing capabilities, will defend
Department of Defense networks, defend the Nation against
cyberattacks of significant consequence, and generate
integrated cyberspace effects in support of operational plans
and contingency operations. (p. 22)

138. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 3.
139. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
p. 3.
140. Ibid., p. 12. Details of U.S. cyber diplomacy include:
There are three key elements to this framework: (1) global
affirmation of the applicability of international law to state
behavior in cyberspace; (2) the development of international
consensus on additional norms and principles of responsible
state behavior in cyberspace that apply during peacetime;
and (3) the development and implementation of practical
CBMs, which can help ensure stability in cyberspace by
reducing the risk of misperception and escalation.
We have forged a growing international consensus on this
framework, and will continue to promote a broad consensus
on international cyber stability wherever possible. Expanding
and building on this consensus is a core diplomatic priority
for the United States. To that end, the Department of State
and the Administration have raised and will continue raising
these issues at a high level in key bilateral and multilateral
engagements with countries around the globe. (pp. 12-13)

141. Ibid., p. 3.
142. Caton, pp. 15-24.
143. “Internet Users.”

88

144. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
p. 19.
145. Ibid., p. 19.
146. “Fact Sheet: Framework for the U.S.-India Cyber Relationship,” Washington DC, The White House, June 7, 2016,
available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/07/fact-sheet-framework-us-india-cyber-relationship,
accessed August 5, 2016. Thirteen specific shared principles for
the relationship were listed; they included:
A commitment to promote international security and
stability in cyberspace through a framework that recognizes
the applicability of international law, in particular the UN
Charter, to state conduct in cyberspace and the promotion of
voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.
A desire to cooperate in strengthening the security and
resilience of critical information infrastructure.

147. The DoD Cyber Strategy, p. 9. For more details on these
potential adversary nations, see Ilan Berman, ed., Strategic Primer
Volume 2: Cybersecurity: Current capabilities and emerging threats,
Washington DC: American Foreign Policy Council, Spring 2016.
148. Ibid., p. 28.
149. Ibid. For more details on recent Russian activity in cyberspace, see Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ tools for Confronting the West:
Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, London,
England: Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, March 2016.
150. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
p. 17.
151. 2015 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 2015, p. 218,
available from uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2015-annual-report-congress, accessed August 20, 2016.

89

152. Department of State International Cyberspace Policy Strategy,
p. 18.
153. Ibid., p. 17.

90

APPENDIX I:
SUMMARY OF PRIMARY MISSIONS, STRATEGIC GOALS,
AND IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTIVES FROM THE DOD
CYBER STRATEGY (APRIL 2015)1
Primary Missions in Cyberspace
•
•
•

First, DoD must defend its own networks, systems, and information.
For its second mission, DoD must be prepared to defend the United States and
its interests against cyberattacks of significant consequence.
Third, if directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, DoD must be
able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and
contingency plans.

Strategic Goal I:
Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations.
•

•
•
•
•

Build the cyber workforce.
o Maintain a persistent training environment.
o Build viable career paths.
o Draw on the National Guard and Reserve.
o Improve civilian recruitment and retention.
o Develop and implement exchange programs with the private sector.
o Support the National Initiative for Cyberspace Education.
Build technical capabilities for cyber operations.*
o Develop the Unified Platform.
o Accelerate research and development.*
Validate and continually refine an adaptive command and control mechanism
for cyber operations.
Establish an enterprise-wide cyber modeling and simulation capability.
Assess Cyber Mission Force capability.*
o Propose, collect, analyze, and report a set of appropriate metrics.
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Strategic Goal II:
Defend the DoD information network, secure DoD data, and mitigate risks to DoD
missions.
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•

•

•

Build the Joint Information Environment (JIE) single security architecture.*
o Enable a robust network defense.
o Develop a framework for developing and integrating new defensive
techniques.
Assess and ensure the effectiveness of the Joint Headquarters for DoD information network (DoDIN) operations.
Mitigate known vulnerabilities.*
Assess DoD’s cyber defense forces.
Improve the effectiveness of the current DoD Computer Network Defense Service Provider (CNDSP) construct in defending and protecting DoD networks.
Plan for network defense and resilience.*
o Integrate cyber into mission assurance assessments.
o Assess Cyber Protection Team (CPT) capabilities.
o Improve weapons systems cybersecurity.
o Build and exercise continuity plans.
Red team DoD’s network defenses.
Mitigate the risk of insider threats.
o Extend beyond information technology and include matters of personnel and reliability.
Exercise to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
o Include DHS and FBI in DoD annual exercise program.
Define and refine the National Guard’s role in supporting law enforcement,
Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities missions.
Improve accountability and responsibility for the protection of data across
DoD and the DIB.
o Continue to assess DFARS rules and NIST standards.
o Continue to expand companies’ participation in threat information
sharing programs.
o Defense Security Service expand education and training programs for
DoD personnel and DIB contractors.
o Review the sufficiency of current classification guidance.
Strengthen DoD’s procurement and acquisition cybersecurity standards.
Build collaboration between the acquisition, intelligence, counterintelligence,
law enforcement, and operations communities to prevent, mitigate, and
respond to data loss.
o DoD CIO and USD(AT&L) assess and update specific information
system security controls that underpin the DFARS.
Use DoD counterintelligence capabilities to defend against intrusions.
o Specify how DoD’s counterintelligence agencies will collaborate with
the broader U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities.
o DoD work with companies to develop alert capabilities and build layered defenses.*
o DoD collaborate with Services’ Damage Assessment Management
Offices to better inform decisions to maintain, modify, or cancel penetrated programs.
Support whole-of-government policies and capabilities to counter intellectual
property theft.
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Strategic Goal III:
Be prepared to defend the U.S. Homeland and U.S. vital interests from disruptive
cyberattacks of significant consequence.
•
•

•
•
•

Continue to develop intelligence and warning capabilities to anticipate threats.*
Develop and exercise capabilities to defend the nation.
o Build partnerships to defend the nation.*
o Conduct an annual comprehensive review of DoD’s defend the nation
capabilities.
Develop innovative approaches to defending U.S. critical infrastructure.
Develop automated information sharing tools.*
Assess DoD’s cyber deterrence posture and strategy.*
o USSTRATCOM must determine whether DoD is building the capabilities required for attributing and deterring key threats and recommend specific actions that DoD can take to improve its cyber
deterrence posture.

Strategic Goal IV:
 uild and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to control
B
escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages.
•

Integrate cyber options into plans.
o Accelerate the integration of cyber requirements into plans.

Strategic Goal V:
 uild and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter shared
B
threats and increase international security and stability.
•

•
•
•

Build partner capability in key regions.*
o Support the hardening and resiliency of Middle Eastern allies’ and
partners’ networks and systems.
o Support the hardening and resiliency of Northeast Asian allies’ networks and systems.
o Build new strategic partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region.
o Work with key NATO allies to mitigate cyber risks to DoD and U.S.
national interests.
o DoD will remain flexible and agile as it builds alliances and partnerships to best respond to shifts in the strategic environment.
Develop solutions to counter the proliferation of destructive malware.
Work with capable international partners to plan and train for cyber operations.
Strengthen the United States cyber dialogue with China to enhance strategic
stability.

* Objective was included in the DoD Fact Sheet.
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ENDNOTES – APPENDIX I
1. Source: The DoD Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Defense, April, 2015, pp. 17-28; Strategic goals
and main objectives are listed verbatim; some of the supporting
sub-objectives are abridged.
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APPENDIX II:
SUMMARY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES AND THEIR
CAPTIONS FROM THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY
(APRIL 2015)1

Page

1

2

3

Related
Primary
Missions
& Strategic
Goals

Caption

I. Introduction (Unsourced
photograph demarcates the
strategy’s first section. It depicts
Secretary Carter at a USCYBERCOM Podium with the DoD
and USCYBERCOM seals in the
background. )
The Red Flag 14-1 Cyber Protection Team works on cyber
defense procedures inside the
Combined Air and Space Operations Center-Nellis, Nellis,
NV. The CPT’s primary goal
is to find and thwart potential
space, cyberspace, and missile
threats against U.S. and allied
forces. (U.S. Air Force photo by
Senior Airman Brett Clashman)
Mr. Joe Sciabica and Maj. Gen.
J. Kevin McLaughlin sign an
Air Force Civil Engineer Center-Air Forces Cyber collaboration agreement. The initiative is
designed to enhance the security of industrial control systems
that support critical Air Force
infrastructures around the
world. (U.S. Air Force photo by
Shannon Carabajal)
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Other Themes

Support from SecDef
N/A

• Joint Operations
• Exercise & Training
PM 3

• Air Force Operations

ST II

• Critical infrastructure protection
PM 1
SG II

• Air Force Operations

5

7

9

Navy Petty Officer 1st Class
Joel Melendez, Naval Network
Warfare Command information systems analysis, Air Force
Staff Sgt. Rogerick Montgomery, U.S. Cyber Command network analysis, and Army Staff
Sgt. Jacob Harding, 780th Military Intelligence Brigade cyber
systems analysis, at an exercise
during Cyber Flag 13-1 at Nellis Air Force Base, NV. (U.S. Air
Force photo by Senior Airman
Matthew
Lancaster)
U.S. Strategic Command serves
as the Defense Department’s
global synchronizer for capabilities that affect every combatant command. Here the sun
sets over some of the assets that
provide capabilities at Forward
Operating Base Sharana in Afghanistan’s Paktika province.
(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Raymond Schaeffer)
II. Strategic Context (Unsourced
photograph demarcates the
strategy’s second section. It depicts the USAF 624th Operations
Center located at Joint Base San
Antonio Lackland,
Texas. The center “receives orders and tasks from the United States Cyber Command,
and works with 24th Air Force
subordinate units to perform a
wide range of cyber missions in
support of Air Force and Joint
Force commanders.” (source:
624th OC Fact Sheet/April 2016)
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• Joint Operations
• Exercise & Training
PM 3
SG II

• Joint Expeditionary
Operations
PM 3
SG I, IV, V

• Air Force Operations

PM 1, 3
SG I, II

11

13

14

17

Airman 1st Class Nate Hammond adjusts the frequency
of a Roll-On Beyond Line of
Sight Enhancement, or ROBE,
data link system at the Transit
Center at Manas, Kyrgyzstan.
A ROBE connects manpower
assets on the ground to other
ground or airborne units. (U.S.
Air Force photo/Senior Airman
Brett Clashman)
III. Strategic Goals (Unsourced
photograph demarcates the
strategy’s third section. It depicts a female USAF lieutenant
and a male USAF staff sergeant
on duty in an unidentified operations center.)
Cyber Flag 14-1 participants
analyze an exercise scenario in
the Red Flag building at Nellis
Air Force Base, NV. Cyber Flag
focuses on exercising USCYBERCOM’s mission of operating and defending DoD networks across the full spectrum
of operations against a realistic
adversary in a virtual environment. (U.S. Air Force photo
by Airman 1st Class Christopher Tam)
IV. Implementation Objectives
(Unsourced photograph demarcates the strategy’s fourth
section. It depicts an unknown
civilian addressing a small audience of Army military and
civilians.)
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• Joint Operations

PM 1, 3
SG I, II, V

PM 1, 3

• Air Force Operations

SG I, III

• Joint Operations
• Exercise & Training
PM 1

• Air Force Operations

S II

N/A
N/A

19

21

22

25

Air Force Tech Sgt. Kevin
Garner and Air Force Senior
Airman David Solnok, cyber
transport technicians assigned
to the 354th Communications
Squadron, hook cables in to the
new Air Force Network router
system at
Eielson Air Force Base, AK.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff
Sgt. Christopher Boitz)
Soldiers monitor networks in
the Cyber Mission Unit Operations Center at the Army’s Cyber Center of Excellence, Fort
Gordon, GA. (Photo by Michael
L. Lewis)
Members of the Ohio National Guard Computer Network
Defense Team conduct cyber
defense operations during exercise Cyber Shield 2015 at Camp
Atterbury, IN. (Ohio National Guard photo by Staff Sgt.
George Davis)
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Plan X program is a foundational cyber warfare program
that is developing platforms for
the Defense Department. DARPA uses advanced touch-table
displays to use finger gestures
and motions to advance the
state of the art in cyber operations. (Photo courtesy of DARPA)
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• Air Force Operations

PM 1, 3
SG, I, II

PM 1, 3

• Army Operations

SG I, II

• Total Force
PM 1, 3

• National Guard
Operations

SG I, II

• Technology

PM 3
SG I

27

29

30

33

U.S. Navy Seaman Katelynn
L. Ehrs discusses network and
communication training with
Royal Thai Navy sailors during
a Cooperation Afloat Readiness
and Training military operations symposium in Sattahip,
Thailand, in 2010. (Photo by
Petty Officer 2nd Class David A.
Brandenburg, U.S. Navy.)
V. Managing the Strategy (Unsourced photograph demarcates the strategy’s fifth section.
It depicts an unknown operations center).
Sailors conduct an exercise at
Fleet Cyber Command’s headquarters in the Frank B. Rowlett
Building, Fort George G. Meade, MD. This exercise features
members of Fleet Cyber Command’s Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber (JFHQ-C).
Conclusion (Unsourced photograph demarcates the strategy’s
final section. It depicts an unknown individual staring at an
unknown screen).
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• International
Operations
PM 3

• Navy Operations

SG I, IV

N/A
N/A

• Joint Operations
PM 1, 3

• Navy Operations

SG I, II

N/A
N/A

ENDNOTES – APPENDIX II
1. The DoD Cyber Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Defense, April, 2015.
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APPENDIX III:
SUMMARY OF CYBERSPACE-RELATED EXCERPTS FROM
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (JUNE 2015), THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (FEBRUARY 2015), AND THE
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (MARCH 2014)1
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015:
The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security
June 2015
•

North Korea also has conducted cyber attacks, including causing major damage to a U.S.
corporation. (p. 2)

•

Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies, unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)—technologies designed to counter U.S. military advantages and curtail access
to the global commons. (p. 3)

•

They [violent extremist organizations] use improvised explosive devices (IED), suicide
vests, and tailored cyber tools to spread terror while seeking ever more sophisticated
capabilities, including WMD. (p. 4)

•

These homeland defense partnerships are complemented by growing investments in
the cyber realm designed to protect vital networks and infrastructure. (p. 7)

•

Such efforts [strengthening our global network of allies and partners] are essential to
maintaining regional peace and building capabilities to provide for missile defense, cyber security, maritime security, and disaster relief. (p. 9)

•

Thus we are striving to interdict attack preparations abroad, defend against limited ballistic missile attacks, and protect cyber systems and physical infrastructure. Key homeland defense capabilities include resilient space-based and terrestrial indications and
warning systems; an integrated intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination architecture; a Ground-Based Interceptor force; a Cyber Mission Force; and, ready ground,
air and naval forces. (p. 11)

•

The results of these initiatives—particularly the enhanced connectivity and cybersecurity provided by the JIE [Joint Information Environment]—will provide the foundation for
future interoperability. (p. 16)

•

Important investments to counter A2/AD [anti-access/area denial], space, cyber, and
hybrid threats include: space and terrestrial-based indications and warning systems,
integrated and resilient ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] platforms,
strategic lift, long-range precision strike weapons, missile defense technologies, undersea systems, remotely operated vehicles and technologies, special operations forces, and
the Cyber Mission Force, among others. (p. 16)
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National Security Strategy
February 2015
•

Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating impacts
of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give rise to anxieties about
global security. (p. i)

•

We are shaping global standards for cybersecurity and building international capacity to
disrupt and investigate cyber threats. (p. ii)

•

The danger of disruptive and even destructive cyber-attack is growing, and the risk of
another global economic slowdown remains. (p. 1)

•

We are fortifying our critical infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage and attack. (p. 3)

•

It also creates shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic diseases, and
transnational terrorism and crime.(p. 4)

•

Collective action is needed to assure access to the shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and
oceans—where the dangerous behaviors of some threaten us all. (p. 7)

•

Our military will remain ready to deter and defeat threats to the homeland, including
against missile, cyber, and terrorist attacks, while mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. (p. 7)

•

We will protect our investment in foundational capabilities like the nuclear deterrent,
and we will grow our investment in crucial capabilities like cyber; space; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. (p. 8)

•

We are working with the owners and operators of our Nation’s critical cyber and physical infrastructure across every sector—financial, energy, transportation, health, information technology, and more—to decrease vulnerabilities and increase resilience. (p. 9)

•

The world is connected by shared spaces—cyber, space, air, and oceans—that enable the
free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. (p. 12)
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•

Cybersecurity
As the birthplace of the Internet, the United States has a special responsibility to lead a
networked world. Prosperity and security increasingly depend on an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our economy, safety, and health are linked through
a networked infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and individual actors who try to avoid attribution. Drawing on the voluntary cybersecurity
framework, we are securing federal networks and working with the private sector, civil
society, and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. critical infrastructure. We will continue to work with the Congress to pursue a legislative
framework that ensures high standards. We will defend ourselves, consistent with U.S.
and international law, against cyber attacks and impose costs on malicious cyber actors,
including through prosecution of illegal cyber activity. We will assist other countries
to develop laws that enable strong action against threats that originate from their infrastructure. Globally, cybersecurity requires that long-standing norms of international
behavior—to include protection of intellectual property, online freedom, and respect for
civilian infrastructure—be upheld and the Internet be managed as a shared responsibility between states and the private sector with civil society and Internet users as key
stakeholders. (pp. 12-13)

•

On cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend
our networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private
actors or the Chinese government. (p. 24)
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014
March 2014

•

Meanwhile, modern warfare is evolving rapidly, leading to increasingly contested battlespace in the air, sea, and space domains—as well as cyberspace—in which our forces
enjoyed dominance in our most recent conflicts. (p. III)

•

The Joint Force must also be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries
who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting
to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace. (p. VII)

•

The Department is taking steps to ensure that progress continues in areas most critical to
meeting future challenges such as full-spectrum cyberspace capabilities and where the
potential for game-changing breakthroughs appears most promising. (p. VII)

•

Cyber. We will invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces to enhance our
ability to conduct cyberspace operations and support military operations worldwide,
to support Combatant Commanders as they plan and execute military missions, and to
counter cyberattacks against the United States. (p. X)

•

In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S.
strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. (p. 6)
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•

The United States has come to depend on cyberspace to communicate in new ways, to
make and store wealth, to deliver essential services, and to perform national security
functions. The importance of cyberspace to the American way of life—and to the Nation’s security—makes cyberspace an attractive target for those seeking to challenge our
security and economic order. Cyberspace will continue to feature increasing opportunities but also constant conflict and competition—with vulnerabilities continually being
created with changes in hardware, software, network configurations, and patterns of
human use. Cyber threats come from a diverse range of countries, organizations, and
individuals whose activities are posing increasingly significant risks to U.S. national interests. Some threats seek to undercut the Department’s near- and long-term military
effectiveness by gaining unauthorized access to Department of Defense and industry
networks and infrastructure on a routine basis. Further, potential adversaries are actively probing critical infrastructure throughout the United States and in partner countries,
which could inflict significant damage to the global economy and create or exacerbate
instability in the security environment. (p. 7)

•

As the frequency and complexity of cyber threats grow, we will continue to place high
priority on cyber defense and cyber capabilities. The Department of Defense will deter,
and when approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense, will disrupt and deny adversary cyberspace operations that threaten U.S. interests. To do so,
we must be able to defend the integrity of our own networks, protect our key systems
and networks, conduct effective cyber operations overseas when directed, and defend
the Nation from an imminent, destructive cyberattack on vital U.S. interests. U.S. forces
will abide by applicable laws, policies, and regulations that protect the privacy and civil
liberties of U.S. persons. Further, the Department will operate consistent with the policy
principles and legal frameworks associated with the law of war. (pp. 14-15)

•

Deterring and defeating cyber threats requires a strong, multi-stakeholder coalition that
enables the lawful application of the authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities resident across the U.S. Government, industry, and international allies and partners. We
support the Federal Government cybersecurity team and will continue working with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity, and with DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to support law enforcement
activities. The Department of Defense remains committed to working with industry and
international partners as well, sharing threat information and capabilities to protect and
defend U.S. critical infrastructure, including in our role as the sector-specific agency for
the defense industrial base. We will ensure that international alliances and partnerships
remain relevant to challenges in the threat environment by helping these partners improve their own cyber defense capabilities and mitigate shared cyber threats through
mutual action. (p. 15)
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•

Through both our alliances and partnerships, we are focused on enhancing our partners’
capacity to address growing regional challenges in areas such as missile defense, cyber
security, space resilience, maritime security, and disaster relief. (p. 17)

•

Joint Forces will be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could
employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S.
forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace. (p. 19)

•

Maintaining our ability to project power will also require exploiting, extending, and
gaining advantages in cyber and space control technologies, as well as in unmanned
systems and stand-off weapons. (p. 20)

•

The Air Force brings capabilities critical to national security in the air, in space, and in
cyberspace and will continue to improve performance in each. (p. 28)

•

Cyber. The Department of Defense will continue to invest in new and expanded cyber
capabilities, building on significant progress made in recent years in recruiting, training,
and retaining cyber personnel. A centerpiece of our efforts is the development of the
Department of Defense Cyber Mission Force. The Force includes Cyber Protection Forces that operate and defend the Department’s networks and support military operations
worldwide, Combat Mission Forces that support Combatant Commanders as they plan
and execute military missions, and National Mission Forces that counter cyberattacks
against the United States. The Cyber Mission Force will be manned by 2016. In addition
to personnel, the Department is investing in state-of-the-art tools and infrastructure to
conduct its missions. To defend its own networks, the Department is also migrating its
information systems to a common, Defense-wide network infrastructure known as the
Joint Information Environment (JIE). This JIE is critical to developing a more defensible
network architecture and to improving network operations. The Department also will
continue working with other U.S. departments and agencies, as well as with allies and
partners abroad, to build their own cyber defense capabilities and mitigate shared cyber
risks. (p. 33)

•

Through both our alliances and partnerships, we are focused on enhancing our partners’
capacity to address growing regional challenges in areas such as missile defense, cyber
security, space resilience, maritime security, and disaster relief. (p. 17)

•

Joint Forces will be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could
employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S.
forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace. (p. 19)

•

Maintaining our ability to project power will also require exploiting, extending, and
gaining advantages in cyber and space control technologies, as well as in unmanned
systems and stand-off weapons. (p. 20)

•

The Air Force brings capabilities critical to national security in the air, in space, and in
cyberspace and will continue to improve performance in each. (p. 28)
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•

Cyber. The Department of Defense will continue to invest in new and expanded cyber
capabilities, building on significant progress made in recent years in recruiting, training,
and retaining cyber personnel. A centerpiece of our efforts is the development of the
Department of Defense Cyber Mission Force. The Force includes Cyber Protection Forces that operate and defend the Department’s networks and support military operations
worldwide, Combat Mission Forces that support Combatant Commanders as they plan
and execute military missions, and National Mission Forces that counter cyberattacks
against the United States. The Cyber Mission Force will be manned by 2016. In addition
to personnel, the Department is investing in state-of-the-art tools and infrastructure to
conduct its missions. To defend its own networks, the Department is also migrating its
information systems to a common, Defense-wide network infrastructure known as the
Joint Information Environment (JIE). This JIE is critical to developing a more defensible
network architecture and to improving network operations. The Department also will
continue working with other U.S. departments and agencies, as well as with allies and
partners abroad, to build their own cyber defense capabilities and mitigate shared cyber
risks. (p. 33)

•

Cyber Mission Forces:
13 National Mission Teams (NMTs) with 8 National Support Teams (NSTs)
27 Combat Mission Teams (CMTs) with 17 Combat Support Teams (CSTs)
18 National Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs)
24 Service CPTs
26 Combatant Command and DOD Information Network CPTs (p. 41)

•

From FY 2001 through FY 2012, the Department saw a steady increase in its civilian
workforce, especially in emerging areas such as intelligence, cyber, and acquisition—
areas where civilians are increasingly operators. (p. 47)

•

Critical modernization programs would also be broken under sequestration-level cuts,
creating deficiencies in the technological capability of our forces despite the requirement
that they be able to respond to a wide array of threats, including substantial A2/AD and
cyberspace challenges, as well as threats posed by adversaries employing innovative
combinations of modern weaponry and asymmetric tactics. (pp. 55-56)

•

The QDR prioritizes investments that support our interests and missions, with particular
attention to space, cyber, situational awareness and intelligence capabilities, stand-off
strike platforms and weapons, technology to counter cruise and ballistic missiles, and
preservation of our superiority undersea. (p. 61)

•

While a U.S. military response to aggression most often begins in the air or maritime
domains—and in the future could begin with confrontations in the cyber and space
domains—they typically include and end with some commitment of forces in the land
domain. (p. 61)
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